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Key terms 
Some of the key terms used in this report are set out here. 
• Accused. A person charged with committing a crime or offence.  
• Beyond reasonable doubt. The standard of proof in a criminal case (see also 
‘standard of proof’ below). See section 4.3.1 for the standard judicial 
directions on reasonable doubt. 
• Complainer. A person who, in criminal proceedings, claims to have been the 
victim of an offence. 
• Consent. In Scottish criminal law, consent in a sexual offence case means 
that the complainer freely agreed to have a particular type of sexual contact 
with the accused. Most sexual offences require proof that the accused acted 
without the complainer’s consent. 
• Corroboration. The requirement in a Scottish criminal case that, to find the 
accused guilty of a charge, there must be two separate sources of evidence 
that (a) the crime charged was committed, and (b) the accused was 
responsible for committing it.  
• Deliberations. The process of discussion by which juries reach a verdict. In 
this research, mock juries were able to deliberate for up to 90 minutes. 
• Directions/jury directions/judge’s directions. The instructions given by a judge 
to a jury at the end of a criminal trial that tell the jury the legal tests that they 
should apply. 
• Dominant juror. A juror who contributes substantially more than most others 
in a particular jury.  
• Hung juries. Where a jury is required to reach a certain majority (e.g. 10 
votes out of 12) in order to return a verdict, and cannot do so, it is referred to 
as a ‘hung jury’. Hung juries are a feature of many jury systems, but Scottish 
juries cannot ‘hang’ as they have 15 members and return verdicts by a 
simple majority of votes.1 This research included mock juries that returned 
simple majority verdicts, and so could not hang.2 It also included mock juries 
that were required to reach at least near unanimity (10 of 12 members, or 13 
of 15 members), which could hang if the minimum number of jurors required 
for a verdict was not reached. 
• Jury-level and juror-level. This study examines both the verdicts reached by 
each mock jury following deliberation (jury-level data) and the views of 
individual participants (juror-level data). For a full discussion of this distinction 
and its relevance, see section 3.2. 
                                         
1 If the number of jurors is reduced from 15 due (for example) to a jury member becoming ill during 
the trial, the accused cannot be convicted unless eight jurors support conviction.  
2 A 12-person jury which split evenly between conviction and acquittal would be deemed to have 
returned a verdict of not guilty: see section 1.1 below. 
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• Jury size. The number of people sitting on a given jury. Half of the mock 
juries in this study had 15 members (the current Scottish practice); the other 
half had 12 members. 
• Majority required. The number of jurors required to support a verdict before it 
can be returned. Half of the mock juries in this study could return a verdict if a 
simple majority of jury members (eight of 15 members, or seven of 12 
members) were in favour of it. This is referred to in this report as a ‘simple 
majority’ verdict. The other half were asked to try and reach unanimity (that 
is, all members agreeing). If they could not do this then they were permitted 
to return a ‘near unanimity’ verdict with no more than two jurors dissenting 
(that is, they required 10 votes from 12 or 13 votes from 15 to return a 
verdict).  
• Minimally contributing juror. A juror who says very little during deliberations. 
In this research, a juror was described as ‘minimally contributing’ if they 
made fewer than three contributions, excluding non-verbal contributions (e.g. 
nodding), simple agreement (e.g. ‘yes, I agree’ with no expansion), or very 
short contributions made only as part of a ‘going around the table’ to check 
which verdict each juror supported. 
• Mock jury. The juries in this study comprised members of the public who 
were eligible to serve on a jury, but were asked to come to a verdict based on 
a (fictional) filmed trial simulation, rather than a real criminal case. This is a 
well-established type of research which is normally referred to as ‘mock jury 
research’. 
• Not proven. Not proven is one of two acquittal verdicts available in Scotland 
(the other being not guilty). It has the same effect in law as not guilty. 
• Number of verdicts. Half of the mock juries in this study had a choice of three 
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, and not proven. The other half had a choice of two 
verdicts: guilty and not guilty. 
• Pre-deliberation and post-deliberation. Mock jurors in this study completed 
two questionnaires. The first, the pre-deliberation questionnaire, was 
completed immediately after they had watched the trial simulation but before 
deliberating with the other members of their jury. The second, the post-
deliberation questionnaire, was completed after deliberations had concluded. 
The terms pre-deliberation and post-deliberation are used to refer to these 
two different stages. 
• Self-defence. A legal defence to a crime of violence where the accused 
claims that they only used force against a person in order to prevent that 
person from attacking them. See section 4.3 for the legal test that applies to 
this defence. 
• Simple majority. A rule requiring a majority of jurors (eight out of 15 or seven 
out of 12) to support a verdict before it can be returned. This is the rule that 
currently applies in Scotland. 
 iii 
• Standard of proof. The level of certainty needed to prove a legal claim. In a 
criminal trial this is “beyond reasonable doubt”. That is, the accused should 
only be convicted if jurors are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of their guilt. 
• Trial simulation. A realistic, but fictional, portrayal of a trial. This research 
included two filmed trial simulations (or ‘mock trials’) – a rape trial and an 
assault trial. These were performed by actors (with the exception of a retired 
judge, who performed that ‘role’), using scripts developed by the research 
team with advice from senior Scottish legal professionals.  
• Unanimity and ‘near unanimity’. A rule requiring that either all, or almost all, 
jurors support a verdict before it is returned. Unanimity implies that every 
juror supports the verdict, while ‘near unanimity’ requires no more than two 
dissenting jurors (i.e. 10 out of 12 or 13 out of 15 must agree). In systems 
operating this rule, juries are usually asked to reach unanimity initially. 
However, if they are unable to do so, they are instructed that a ‘near 
unanimous’ verdict may be accepted. This is the rule that currently applies in 
England and Wales. 
• Verdict choice. This report uses the term ‘verdict choice’ to refer either to the 
verdict chosen by the jury (i.e. the verdict actually returned), or to the verdict 
which individual jurors personally preferred (as indicated in their responses to 
questionnaires administered before and after deliberations), which may differ 
from the verdict returned by the jury as a whole. The report makes it clear in 
each case whether jury-level or juror-level verdict choice is being considered. 
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Executive summary 
This report presents the findings of a large-scale mock jury study in Scotland. The 
Scottish jury system differs from most English language jurisdictions in three main 
ways: 
• There are three verdicts: guilty, not guilty and not proven (most major 
English language jurisdictions only have two verdicts: guilty and not guilty). 
• Each jury has 15 members (rather than the typical 12). 
• Verdicts are returned by a simple majority (eight out of 15 jurors, rather 
than requiring juries to reach unanimity or near unanimity). 
The Scottish Government commissioned this study to address two overarching 
questions:  
• What effects do the unique features of the Scottish jury system have on 
jury reasoning and jury decision making?  
• What are jurors’ understandings of the not proven verdict and why 
might they choose this verdict over another verdict? 
Research methods 
This study is the largest of its kind ever undertaken in the UK, involving 64 mock 
juries and 969 individual participants. The research team staged jury deliberations 
between May and September 2018, in venues in central Glasgow and Edinburgh. 
Jurors were recruited to be broadly representative of the Scottish population aged 
18-75 in terms of gender, age, education and working status. This meant that the 
mock juries were similar in demographic composition to the actual population 
eligible for jury service. In order to assess the effect of the Scottish jury system’s 
unique features on decision-making, juries varied in terms of the number of verdicts 
available to them (two or three), jury size (12 or 15) and the size of majority they 
were required to reach (simple majority or unanimity).  
Each jury watched a video of either a mock rape trial or a mock assault trial, lasting 
approximately one hour. Short clips from the two trials are available to watch online; 
links are in the footnote below.3 Jurors completed a brief questionnaire recording 
their initial views on the verdict, before deliberating as a group for up to 90 minutes 
and returning a verdict (if the jury had been able to arrive at one). After returning 
their verdict, jurors completed a final questionnaire covering their beliefs about the 
not proven verdict and views about the deliberation process, as well as their final 
views on the verdict.  
The data generated from the study included: quantitative data from the 
questionnaires; quantitative and qualitative data from the deliberations (which were 
filmed, audio recorded and analysed by the researchers); and quantitative 
‘metadata’ on each jury (e.g. length of deliberations, verdict returned, etc).  
  
                                         
3 Assault trial: https://youtu.be/gxeU-sFzOxQ; Rape trial: https://youtu.be/kDAGaSedje8; Judge’s 
opening and closing directions: https://youtu.be/ecemRns-gDk  
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Realism and study limitations 
In comparison with many previous mock jury studies, this research was significantly 
more realistic. It used relatively long filmed trials rather than relying on transcripts, 
with the trials reviewed for realism by senior Scottish legal practitioners. It included 
a lengthy group discussion element (some studies either omit this or allow very 
limited time). Each mock jury included either 12 or 15 people (smaller groups are 
common in much mock jury research).  
Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of any research involving 
mock juries. First, participants knew that they were not acting as jurors in a real 
trial. The vast majority of participants appeared to take the exercise seriously – as 
indicated by the fact that discussions between jurors who disagreed on the verdict 
regularly became animated. However, it is not possible to control for any impact 
that the artificial nature of the mock jury experience might have had on 
deliberations or verdicts. 
Second, though the study was the largest of its type to date in the UK, the total 
number of juries (64) was nonetheless relatively small, making it unlikely that 
anything other than large differences in verdicts between juries would be picked up 
statistically. However, the 64 juries were made up of 863 individual jurors, each of 
whom was asked for their individual view on what verdict should be returned (using 
questionnaires).4 This much larger sample of jurors means we can compare jurors 
asked to choose between two and three verdicts, those asked to reach a simple 
majority and those asked to reach a unanimous verdict, and jurors on 12 and 15-
person juries.  
This data can tell us whether or not particular features of the jury system might 
incline jurors in one direction or another (for example, whether being required to 
reach a unanimous decision might make a juror more or less likely to support an 
acquittal). As a result the research may indicate whether changes to the jury 
system, if applied across a larger number of finely balanced trials, might affect the 
likelihood of juries returning a particular verdict. However, we cannot use this data 
to arrive at an estimate of how many more juries might return a particular verdict.  
Third, the findings in this study are based on jurors’ responses to two specific trials, 
both of which were deliberately finely balanced in order to encourage discussion of 
the not proven verdict. Had the evidence in these trials been differently balanced, or 
had we used different kinds of cases, the balance between verdicts would probably 
have been different.  
 
Important note on the findings  
As expected given the sample size, there were no statistically significant 
differences in the number of guilty versus acquittal verdicts returned between 12 
                                         
4 An additional 105 ‘spare’ jurors watched the trial videos and completed a questionnaire, but were 
sent home prior to deliberations to ensure that each jury only included either 12 or 15 people at 
this stage. Ipsos MORI recruiters deliberately recruited more jurors than were needed, to allow for 
non-attendance on the day. One further juror left immediately prior to deliberations, as they 
became unwell. 
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and 15-person juries, two-verdict and three-verdict juries, or between juries asked 
to reach a simple majority and those asked to reach a unanimous verdict.  
However, there were a number of significant differences in the verdicts favoured by 
individual jurors. Therefore the key findings section below focuses primarily on what 
difference the unique features of the Scottish system make to individual jurors’ 
verdict preferences, and to the process by which they reach their verdicts. 
Key findings 
The overarching finding is that juror verdicts were affected by how the jury 
system was constructed. The research found that the number of jurors, the 
number of verdicts available, and the size of majority required do have an 
effect on verdict choice.  
In other words, jurors’ verdict preferences, in finely balanced trials, are not simply a 
reflection of their assessment of the evidence presented, but can also be affected 
by features of the jury system within which this evidence is considered. 
What difference does the size of the jury make? 
What difference does jury size make to verdict choice? 
Jurors in 15-person juries were less likely to change their minds on the 
verdict than people in 12-person juries. 
Jurors in 15-person juries were more likely than jurors in 12-person juries to think 
the verdict should be guilty (after deliberating). However, this does not necessarily 
indicate that 15-person juries would be more likely to return guilty verdicts across a 
larger number of differently balanced trials. Rather, it may reflect the fact that, 
where a 15-person jury is split, more people (on average) need to change their 
position to facilitate a verdict than would be the case for a 12-person jury. This, in 
turn, may mean that ‘minority’ jurors in a 15-person jury have less motivation to shift 
their position to bring deliberations to a close. In this study, those supporting a 
guilty verdict were generally in the minority, but this will not always be the case. 
This finding may, therefore, indicate that individuals on larger juries are more likely 
to stick with their initial view, rather than indicating a greater propensity for larger 
juries to convict. This is supported by the finding that jurors in 15-person juries were 
less likely than jurors in 12-person juries to change their mind about the verdict.  
What difference does jury size make to how juries reach their verdicts? 
15-person juries were associated with somewhat lower levels of juror 
participation than 12-person juries across a number of measures.
For example, in 15-person juries: jurors were more likely to be observed wanting to 
contribute, but being unable to do so; there were more dominant jurors and more 
minimally contributing jurors; and jurors gave lower ratings of their own influence 
over the verdict. 
However, the higher participation level in 12-person juries was not associated with 
longer deliberations: there was no difference in average deliberation length 
between 12-person and 15-person juries. Similarly, there was no difference 
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between 12 and 15-person juries in the number of evidential issues discussed, or 
the extent or accuracy of discussion of legal issues. 
Potential implications of reducing jury size 
Taken together, these findings suggest that reducing the number of jurors on 
Scottish juries from 15 to 12: 
• Might lead to more jurors participating more fully in the deliberations. 
• Would be unlikely to have much impact on deliberation length or the range of 
evidential or legal issues discussed. 
What difference does the size of the majority required make? 
What difference does the majority required make to verdict choice?  
Jurors who were asked to reach a simple majority were more likely to favour 
a guilty verdict than jurors asked to reach a unanimous verdict. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that requiring jurors to reach a unanimous 
verdict would result in fewer guilty verdicts. It might simply reflect a greater 
tendency for jurors to change from agreeing with the minority view to agreeing with 
the majority view (in 51 out of 64 juries, the majority wanted to acquit the accused 
at the start of deliberations). However, there is some evidence to suggest that 
jurors who are in the minority at the start of deliberations may be less willing to shift 
their view towards a majority preference for guilty than they would towards a 
majority preference for acquittal – five of the six unanimity juries that started with a 
majority for guilty could not reach a unanimous decision and ended up hanging, 
compared with only one of the 25 unanimity juries that started with a majority for 
acquittal. 
What difference does the size of the majority required make to how juries 
reach their verdicts?  
Jurors asked to reach a unanimous verdict took substantially longer to 
deliberate than did those required to reach a simple majority.  
Although there were no significant differences between unanimity juries and simple 
majority juries in observed levels of juror participation, there were some differences 
in jurors’ own perceptions of their involvement. In particular, jurors asked to reach a 
unanimous verdict were a little more likely to feel they had been fully involved and 
had influenced the jury’s decision. 
In combination with the longer average deliberation time for unanimity juries, this 
suggests that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict may provide greater 
opportunity for everyone to feel that they have been able to put their views across 
before a verdict is reached. It is worth noting, however, that this was not associated 
with any increase in the range of evidential issues discussed or the extent or 
accuracy of discussion of legal issues. 
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Potential implications of changing the size of the majority required to reach a 
verdict 
Taken together, these findings suggest that changing from the current simple 
majority system to unanimity: 
• Might incline more jurors towards an acquittal – and might, therefore, lead to 
more acquittals over a larger number of trials. As noted above, however, it is 
not possible to estimate the likely scale of any such impact, since the effect 
will vary depending on factors including the balance of evidence and the 
initial balance of opinion in the jury in each trial.  
• May lead to longer deliberations and more jurors feeling that they have been 
involved in the deliberations (although there is no evidence this would 
increase the range of evidential or legal issues discussed). 
What difference does the not proven verdict make? 
What difference does the not proven verdict make to verdict choice?  
Where the not proven verdict was available, acquitting juries tended to 
choose not proven rather than not guilty as the means to acquit the accused. 
Individual jurors were also less likely to favour a guilty verdict when the not 
proven verdict was available. 
26 out of 32 juries where not proven was available returned acquittals and, of those 
26, 24 returned not proven verdicts and only two returned not guilty verdicts. This 
suggests that, in finely balanced trials, juries have a preference for acquitting via 
not proven rather than not guilty.  
Individual jurors were significantly less likely to favour a guilty verdict when the not 
proven verdict was available. This difference was apparent both before and after 
deliberating, indicating that the availability of not proven has an effect on individual 
verdict preferences independent of any impact of group deliberation. 
What difference does the not proven verdict make to how juries reach their 
verdict? 
The presence or absence of the not proven verdict had little impact on the 
length of deliberations; the number of evidential issues raised; the extent or 
accuracy of the discussion of legal issues (other than discussion of the not 
proven verdict itself); or on levels of juror participation across various 
measures. However, its availability was associated with slightly lower levels 
of dissatisfaction (although not with significantly higher levels of 
satisfaction) with the experience of serving on a jury.  
Potential implications of removing the not proven verdict 
Taken together, these findings suggest that removing the not proven verdict: 
• Might lead to more jurors favouring a guilty verdict, which might, therefore, 
lead to more guilty verdicts over a larger number of trials. As noted above, 
however, it is not possible to estimate the likely scale of any such impact, 
since the effect will vary depending on factors including the balance of 
evidence and the initial balance of opinion in the jury in each trial.  
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• May not have much impact on other key aspects of the jury decision-making 
process, such as deliberation length or juror participation. 
• May be associated with a slight increase in juror dissatisfaction. 
Were there any differences in the impact of jury size, majority 
required and the number of verdicts between the rape and assault 
trial? 
In both the rape and the assault trials, requiring a unanimous verdict was 
associated with more jurors favouring acquittal after deliberation.  
The general pattern of differences in individual jurors’ verdicts by both jury size and 
number of verdicts, reported above, was also similar across both trial types – in 
other words, individual jurors were less likely to shift their views in 15-person than 
in 12-person juries, and less likely to favour guilty when the not proven verdict was 
available. However, these differences were only statistically significant for the 
assault trial. Findings for individual trial types are based on around half the sample 
– 430 jurors. This means that bigger differences would be required to reach 
statistical significance. 
How do jury size, majority required and the number of verdicts 
available interact with each other? 
Each unique feature of the Scottish jury system was independently and significantly 
related to the likelihood of individual jurors favouring a particular verdict in this 
research, in the ways described above. However, these features are also likely to 
interact in particular ways. Analysis of these interactions indicates that: 
• The size of the majority required is the feature that has the biggest 
impact on the likelihood of individual jurors changing their view on 
which verdict should be returned. Jurors were more likely to change their 
view in juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict. 
• The combination of features that produced the most jurors in favour of 
conviction after deliberating was 15-person, simple majority, two-
verdict juries. In contrast, the combination which produced the lowest 
number of jurors favouring conviction was 12-person, unanimous, three-
verdict verdict juries. Neither combination currently exists in practice, but the 
first combination (in which jurors were most likely to prefer a guilty verdict) is 
how the Scottish system would look if the not proven verdict were to be 
abolished without any other reforms taking place at the same time. 
How do jurors understand the not proven verdict? 
There was evidence of some inconsistency in jurors’ understanding of what 
the not proven verdict means, along with some confusion over the 
consequences of not proven for the accused.  
It should be stressed, however, that while there was some uncertainty over the 
meaning of the not proven verdict, jurors relatively rarely expressed beliefs about 
the verdict that were definitively incorrect. This is in part because the not proven 
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verdict does not have a specific definition beyond it being one of two verdicts of 
acquittal. This leaves room for a number of different understandings of its meaning 
and purpose, which are explored below. 
Across the 32 mock juries that had not proven as an option, the meaning and 
consequences of the not proven verdict were rarely discussed at any length during 
deliberations, even in juries where that verdict was returned. Where the not proven 
verdict was discussed, however, there was evidence of jurors holding inconsistent 
understandings of what the verdict meant, along with some confusion over its 
effect. In particular, jurors expressed uncertainty as to how it differed (if at all) from 
a not guilty verdict.  
Although not proven and not guilty have the same effect in law, jurors tended to 
give different reasons for choosing them. Those who favoured the not proven 
verdict tended to base this on a belief that the evidence did not prove guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt, or on the difficulty of choosing between two competing accounts. 
Jurors choosing the not guilty verdict (where not proven was also an option), on the 
other hand, tended to attribute this to a belief that the accused was innocent or to 
some aspect of the complainer’s or witness’ evidence that suggested that they were 
not giving a truthful account. 
The idea that the not proven verdict should be used when jurors think that the 
accused is probably guilty but that this has not been proven to the necessary 
standard arose frequently, albeit briefly, in deliberations. It was also the issue on 
which there was the clearest agreement in questionnaire responses. Jurors also 
expressed the view that there would be a lingering stigma attached to receiving a 
verdict of not proven. 
Other implications: supporting juror understanding 
As discussed above, there is no evidence from this study that changing one or 
more of the unique features of the Scottish jury system would have an impact on 
the number of evidential issues or on the extent or accuracy of legal issues 
discussed during deliberations.  
However, the findings do raise important questions about what can be done to 
support jurors’ understanding of legal issues, including their understanding of the 
meaning and effects of the not proven verdict. Several potential misunderstandings 
on the part of individual jurors arose relatively frequently across the mock juries 
(e.g. a belief that the accused should prove his innocence, a belief that the accused 
can be retried following a not proven verdict but not a not guilty verdict, and 
misunderstanding of the fact that self-defence is a legitimate defence to an assault 
charge, even when the fact the accused inflicted the injury is not in dispute). This 
suggests a need to consider whether additional guidance (such as written routes to 
verdict or written reminders of key legal principles) would be helpful to aid jurors’ 
discussions. Another strand of this research involved an extensive evidence review 
of ways in which juror communication methods might be improved: see J Chalmers 
and F Leverick, Methods of Conveying Information to Jurors: An Evidence Review 
(2018). 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background to this study 
The Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review was established by the Scottish 
Government to consider what additional safeguards and changes to law and 
practice might be required if the general requirement for corroboration in criminal 
cases was removed. Its final report recommended that “[t]he time is right to 
undertake research into jury reasoning and decision-making. Simultaneous 
changes to several unique aspects of the Scottish jury system should only be made 
on a fully informed basis.”5 
There is a substantial body of jury research worldwide.6 However, the vast majority 
is concerned with the traditional common law jury found in most major English 
language jurisdictions, which typically: has 12 members, a choice of two verdicts 
(guilty or not guilty), and is required to reach a unanimous verdict on which the 
whole jury is agreed.7 
The Scottish jury, by contrast: has 15 members; chooses between three possible 
verdicts (guilty, not guilty and not proven); and is required to reach a ‘simple 
majority’ (eight out of 15 jurors) to return a verdict. Unlike the traditional common 
law jury, a Scottish jury cannot fail to reach a verdict (‘hang’), because 15 jurors 
cannot split in a way that allows this.8  
There is very little existing evidence on what (if any) difference the distinctive 
features of the Scottish system make to the jury’s operation in practice, in 
comparison with the traditional common law jury. In 2017, the Scottish Government 
commissioned Ipsos MORI Scotland, in collaboration with Professors James 
Chalmers and Fiona Leverick (University of Glasgow) and Professor Vanessa 
Munro (University of Warwick), to undertake research on jury decision making. The 
                                         
5 Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Final Report (2015) para 12.24. 
6 See e.g. the detailed paper prepared by researchers for Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the 
Criminal Courts of England and Wales: P Darbyshire, A Maughan and A Stewart, What Can the 
English Legal System Learn from Jury Research Published up to 2001? (2002). More recently, see 
DJ Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science (2012), who states (at 8) that “1,500 is 
a plausible estimate of the number of published jury studies by the end of 2011”. 
7 Although the trend over time – and here practice varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction – has been 
to permit the jury to return a verdict with either one or two jurors dissenting from that outcome. See 
J Chalmers, “Jury majority, size and verdicts”, in J Chalmers, F Leverick and A Shaw (eds), Post-
Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014) 140 at 143-151. 
8 While the three possible verdicts open to the jury mean that there may be no verdict which 
commands the support of eight or more jurors, such cases will always be regarded as an acquittal 
because not guilty and not proven have the same effect in law. Where jurors are split between the 
two acquittal verdicts, the rules differ depending on whether the jury deliberated with its full 15 
members or not. Where the jury had 15 members, the verdict will be recorded as one of not guilty 
or not proven where there is a majority for that verdict amongst the jurors voting for acquittal, but 
an equal split between acquittal verdicts will be recorded as not proven: Kerr v HM Advocate 1992 
SLT 1031. Where, exceptionally, the jury had an even number of members (if one or more of the 
initial 15 were unable to continue e.g. due to illness), such a jury, if split evenly between conviction 
and acquittal, will always be deemed to have returned a verdict of not guilty: Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act 1995 s 90(2). 
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main element of the research was a mock jury study – the largest of its kind in the 
UK to date – involving 64 mock juries and 969 individual participants. 
1.2 Research questions  
The key research questions for this study were: 
• What effects do the unique features of the Scottish jury system have on 
jury reasoning and jury decision-making?9  
• What are jurors’ understandings of the not proven verdict and why might 
they choose this verdict over another verdict? 
Specifically, the research explored whether there were any differences in jury 
reasoning and decision-making depending on:  
• The number of verdicts: three verdicts (guilty, not guilty and not proven), or 
two verdicts (guilty and not guilty).  
• Jury size: 15 members or 12 members. 
• The majority required before jurors can return a verdict: a simple majority or 
unanimity among the whole jury. 
In essence, the research was designed to test whether or not any of these features 
appears to incline juries in one direction or another in terms of their verdict and the 
process by which they arrive at this when other aspects (such as the trial content) 
are held constant. 
Two further research questions focused on (i) effective methods for communicating 
with juries and (ii) the use of pre-recorded evidence. These questions were 
addressed by evidence reviews, published in 2018.10 
1.3 What do we know from previous research? 
In this section, we summarise the findings from the small body of existing jury 
research which is directly relevant to the distinctive features of the Scottish system 
(jury size, the majority required to return a verdict, and the not proven verdict).11 In 
summarising findings, we also discuss some of the limitations associated with 
specific mock jury studies.12 Appendix B includes a more detailed discussion of the 
                                         
9 These were supplemented by a number of more detailed sub-questions, expanding on different 
aspects to be addressed in answering these over-arching questions (see Annex A for a full list of 
the research questions). 
10 J Chalmers and F Leverick, Methods of Conveying Information to Juries: An Evidence Review 
(2018); V Munro, The Impact of the Use of Pre-Recorded Evidence on Juror Decision-Making: An 
Evidence Review (2018). 
11 This is not to assert that the rest of the extensive body of existing research focused on the 
traditional common law jury is irrelevant to Scotland. It would be relevant to any policy decision to 
introduce a jury system more akin to the model found in most major English language jurisdictions, 
and might also be relied upon more generally if research suggested that the differences made by 
the distinctive features of the Scottish jury were limited in their effect. 
12 This does not imply any criticism of the researchers involved – highly realistic mock jury studies 
require significant resources, and variations in research methods are generally a result of resource 
constraints. 
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methods used in mock jury research in general, and the issues that should be 
considered in weighing findings from such studies.  
1.3.1 Jury size 
There is no existing research that specifically assesses the impact of having 15 
jurors, as is the case in Scotland. However, researchers in the United States have 
examined the possible impact of reducing the traditional common law 12-person 
jury to a smaller size (usually six).13 This research indicates that 12-person juries 
are preferable to smaller juries, on the basis that a smaller jury is less likely to be 
properly representative of the community, more likely not to contain members of 
minority groups, more likely to deliberate for a shorter time (at the expense of better 
deliberation), and possibly less likely to recall evidence accurately.14 These findings 
do not, however, imply that increasing the size of the jury beyond 12 would 
necessarily have positive effects. Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that 
the efficacy of group decision-making can be impeded as groups increase in size.15 
1.3.2 The majority required for a verdict: simple majority and unanimity 
There is no prior research that has directly considered the impact of the Scottish 
requirement that jurors reach a ‘simple majority’ before returning a verdict. 
However, researchers have examined the effect of requiring different majorities for 
a verdict. For example, Hastie, Penrod and Pennington’s extensive Inside the Jury 
research compared three different decision rules: one requiring all 12 jurors to 
agree unanimously, one requiring 10 votes out of 12 for a verdict, and one requiring 
eight votes out of 12.16 Other studies have generally compared a requirement of 
absolute unanimity with an alternative somewhat short of this (such as a rule 
requiring two-thirds or more of jurors to agree on a verdict).17  
Such research suggests, unsurprisingly, that juries are more likely to hang (fail to 
reach a verdict) when all jurors are required to agree unanimously compared with 
requiring a majority short of unanimity.18 There is also some evidence to suggest 
that requiring jurors to reach a unanimous verdict may be associated with better 
quality deliberation – “deliberations are likely to be evidence driven and more 
thorough than when a majority rule is in place”.19  
                                         
13 This research arose out of decisions of the US Supreme Court which concluded that the size of 
a jury could not be reduced below six members without violating an accused’s Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial. See Williams v Florida 399 US 78 (1970); Ballew v Georgia 435 US 223 (1978).  
14 MJ Saks and MW Marti, “A meta-analysis of the effects of jury size” (1997) 21 Law and Human 
Behavior 451. 
15 See J Chalmers, “Jury majority, size and verdicts”, in J Chalmers, F Leverick and A Shaw (eds), 
Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014) 140 at 156. 
16 R Hastie, SD Penrod and N Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983) 60. 
17 See e.g. the research surveyed in R Hastie, SD Penrod and N Pennington, Inside the Jury 
(1983) 29-32. 
18 R Hastie, SD Penrod and N Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983) 60. 
19 BH Bornstein and E Greene, “Jury decision making: implications for and from psychology” 
(2011) 20 Current Directions in Psychological Science 63 at 65. 
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1.3.3 The not proven verdict 
There has been limited research to date on the effect of the not proven verdict, and 
that which exists has a number of limitations. First, previous studies of not proven 
have used trial summaries (either written or audio), which is less realistic than 
showing jurors audio-visual recreations of trials. Second, all but one study to date 
involved jurors returning individual verdicts, rather than deliberating as a group as 
they would in a real trial.20  
Bearing these limitations in mind, one of the four published studies found that 
having the not proven verdict available was associated with jurors being 
significantly less likely to convict. Differences in the other studies were not 
statistically significant (though they tended to point in the same direction).21  
There is also very limited evidence on jurors’ understanding of the not proven 
verdict. Where this has been examined, the focus has often been on beliefs about 
the possibility of a retrial after a not proven verdict. According to the Jury Manual, it 
is “thought to be good practice” for judges in criminal trials to “inform the jury 
specifically that ‘not proven’ is a verdict of acquittal and that the accused cannot be 
tried again for the same offence”.22 However, a 1993 opinion poll commissioned by 
the BBC found that 48% of the Scottish public wrongly believed that a not proven 
verdict meant the accused could be retried if new evidence became available.23 
Similar views have also been observed in mock jury studies. For example, Hope 
and others24 found that around a third of participants believed the accused could be 
retried after a not proven verdict, despite having heard judicial instructions stating 
this was not possible.25 They also observed a strong perceived ‘stigma’ associated 
with the not proven verdict.26 
A small number of mock jury studies have also examined differences in whether 
jurors returning not proven verdicts were more likely to think the accused was 
probably guilty (but the evidence was insufficient for a conviction) than those 
                                         
20 The one study (‘Study 2’, as reported in L Hope and others, “A third verdict option: exploring the 
impact of the not proven verdict on mock juror decision making” (2008) 32 Law and Human 
Behaviour 241) which involved deliberation used groups of four to eight jurors, much smaller than 
the Scottish jury of 15 members. In addition, the existing studies discussed here (except Hope and 
others, Study 2) relied heavily on the use of students as mock jurors, rather than a broader 
community sample. 
21 See Annex C for more detail on existing studies of the not proven verdict. 
22 Judicial Institute for Scotland, Jury Manual (2019) 107.1. The mock juries in the present study 
were directed by the judge in accordance with this practice. 
23 K Bruce, “Not proven verdict leaves 60% of Scots in dark, claims poll”, The Herald 13 May 1993, 
p 2. A further 11% said that they did not know. Following the Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011 
it is now, in some circumstances, possible to prosecute an acquitted person again if new evidence 
becomes available, but this does not depend in any way on the initial verdict having been not 
proven rather than not guilty. See further section 5.4.2. 
24 L Hope and others, “A third verdict option: exploring the impact of the not proven verdict on 
mock juror decision making” (2008) 32 Law and Human Behaviour 241.  
25 At 246 (35% of participants who had the option of three verdicts). 
26 At 249. 
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returning not guilty verdicts. Curley and others27 found that ratings of ‘likelihood of 
guilt’ were considerably higher among those who favoured not proven compared to 
those who preferred not guilty (a mean of 58.0 compared to 39.2).28 In contrast, 
Hope and others did not find any significant difference in ‘likelihood of guilt’ ratings 
between jurors who favoured not proven and jurors who favoured not guilty.29  
Summary 
In summary, in so far as existing jury research has engaged with the key research 
questions in the present study, it suggests that: 
• 12-person juries generally have higher quality deliberations than smaller juries. 
However, it is unclear whether increasing jury size further (to 15) has any 
benefits. 
• Requiring jurors to reach ‘unanimity’ may make deliberations more thorough, but 
may also result in more ‘hung’ juries. There is no existing research on the 
Scottish ‘simple majority’ requirement. 
• Evidence on the not proven verdict’s impact is equivocal but suggests that jurors 
may be less likely to convict when the not proven verdict is available.  
• There are some misunderstandings about the possibility of a retrial after a not 
proven verdict. Some limited evidence also suggests that jurors who favour not 
proven may be more likely than jurors who favour not guilty to think the accused 
is probably guilty. 
The research questions for this study clearly cannot be fully answered on the basis 
of existing evidence. It is in this context that the Scottish Government 
commissioned the large-scale mock jury study which is the focus of this report. 
1.4 Report structure  
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 describes the research methods for our mock jury study. It explains the 
steps taken to maximise realism and the limitations of the study.  
Chapter 3 presents findings on the effects of the unique features of the Scottish 
jury system (three verdicts – including not proven, 15 jurors, and requiring a simple 
majority verdict) on verdict choice.  
Chapter 4 discusses how the unique features of the Scottish jury system impact on 
the way in which juries reach their decisions. 
Chapter 5 examines juror understandings of the not proven verdict.  
Chapter 6 summarises the conclusions and discusses the potential implications of 
any changes to the unique features of the Scottish jury system. 
                                         
27 LJ Curley and others, “Threshold point utilisation in juror decision-making” (2019) 26 Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law 110. 
28 At 118. 
29 L Hope and others, “A third verdict option: exploring the impact of the not proven verdict on 
mock juror decision making” (2008) 32 Law and Human Behaviour 241 at 245.  
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Annexes A to K contain further detail on the study aims, background and methods, 
including: the full research questions, a summary of issues to consider when 
assessing mock jury research, a more detailed summary of previous research on 
the not proven verdict, summaries of the content of the trial videos used in the 
research, copies of the research materials, and details of the statistical tests used. 
They also include additional findings tables, and the remit and membership of the 
Research Advisory Group for the project. 
The key terms section at the start of this report explains some of the key legal and 
other terms referred to in this report.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Summary of approach 
In Scotland, the Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibits questioning jurors who have 
participated in actual criminal trials about their discussions during deliberation. The 
research questions set out in Chapter 1 were therefore addressed by a large-scale 
mock jury experiment.  
64 juries watched a video of either a mock rape or a mock assault trial, then 
deliberated in groups for up to 90 minutes before returning a verdict. In order to 
assess the effect of the Scottish jury system’s unique features on jury reasoning 
and decision-making, the 64 mock juries varied with respect to: 
• Number of verdicts – 32 juries had two verdicts (guilty and not guilty) and 32 
had three verdicts (guilty, not guilty and not proven) available to them. 
• Jury size – 32 juries deliberated in groups of 12, and 32 in groups of 15. 
• Majority required – 32 juries were asked to reach a unanimous verdict, on 
which each member of the jury was agreed, and 32 were asked to return a 
simple majority verdict (seven out of 12 or eight out of 15 jurors). 
In combination with trial type (rape or assault), this resulted in 16 possible 
combinations, with each combination run four times (see Table 2.1, below).  
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Table 2.1 Summary of conditions for mock juries 
Condition 
number 
Jury size 
(15 or 12) 
Majority 
required 
(simple 
majority or 
unanimous) 
Number of 
verdicts 
(three or 
two) 
Trial type Number of 
experiments 
(mock 
juries) per 
condition  
Number 
of jurors 
per 
condition 
 1 15 SM 3 Rape 4 60 
 2 15 SM 2 Rape 4 60 
 3 15 U 3 Rape 4 60 
 4 15 U 2 Rape 4 60 
 5 12 SM 3 Rape 4 48 
 6 12 SM 2 Rape 4 48 
 7 12 U 3 Rape 4 48 
 8 12 U 2 Rape 4 48 
 9 15 SM 3 Assault 4 60 
10 15 SM 2 Assault 4 60 
11 15 U 3 Assault 4 60 
12 15 U 2 Assault 4 60 
13 12 SM 3 Assault 4 48 
14 12 SM 2 Assault 4 48 
15 12 U 3 Assault 4 48 
16 12 U 2 Assault 4 48 
Total     64 864 
 
The remainder of this chapter explains each aspect of the research methods in 
more detail, including efforts to maximise realism. 
2.2 The participants (‘mock jurors’) 
‘Mock jurors’ were recruited in Edinburgh and Glasgow from members of the 
general public eligible for jury service by Ipsos MORI specialist recruiters, using a 
recruitment questionnaire developed by the research team. We recruited more 
jurors than required for each session, to ensure that we were able to run each jury 
with either 12 or 15 jurors after allowing for ‘no shows’ on the day. In practice, this 
meant that there were sometimes more jurors than required. In total, 863 jurors 
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participated in deliberations across the 64 juries.30 An additional 105 ‘spare’ jurors 
watched the trial videos and completed a questionnaire before being sent home 
(see 2.4, below, and questionnaire C in Annex E). 
Recruiters obtained informed consent to participate at the time of recruitment. The 
researcher responsible for each jury also reminded participants at the outset that 
they were volunteers and were free to leave at any time. All mock jurors were given 
a £50 thank-you payment in recognition of the time they had given up to participate, 
and a helpline leaflet in case they had found aspects of the evidence or process 
distressing. 
2.2.1 Mock juror characteristics 
Quotas for recruiting jurors were based on the profile of the Scottish population 
aged 18-75 (75 was set as an upper limit, since those aged 71+ can be excused 
from jury service on grounds of age). While there is no directly relevant Scottish 
data, research in England and Wales found that – contrary to common myths about 
certain groups being under- or over-represented in jury composition – “serving 
jurors were remarkably representative of the local community in terms of ethnicity, 
gender, income, occupation and religion”.31  
Table 2.2 shows the profile of jurors who (a) participated (n = 969) and (b) actually 
went on to deliberate (after ‘spare’ jurors were sent home, n = 863), compared with 
the profile of the Scottish population aged 18-75. Overall, the profile was fairly 
similar to that of the Scottish population in terms of gender and age group (although 
slightly more women participated overall, the gender balance of those who 
deliberated was closer to the actual population figures32). In comparison with the 
population as a whole, slightly fewer jurors indicated that their highest qualification 
was at school-level or below. However, 10% of participants did not answer the 
survey question about their highest qualification. As lower educational attainment is 
often associated with non-response in questionnaires,33 it is possible that this group 
includes more people with no or low qualifications than with higher level 
qualifications.  
  
                                         
30 One 12-person jury proceeded with 11 jurors, as a juror went home ill immediately before the 
start of deliberations. A real trial can similarly proceed where a juror falls ill and can no longer 
participate: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 90. 
31 C Thomas, “Exposing the myths of jury service” [2008] Criminal Law Review 415 at 422. 
32 Where more than 12/15 jurors attended, researchers tried to ensure gender and age balance in 
the juries when selecting ‘spare’ jurors. 
33 G Reyes, “Understanding non response rates: insights from 600,000 opinion surveys” (World 
Bank, 2016). 
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Table 2.2 – Profile of jurors who participated in mock juries  
 All jurors who 
participated 
All jurors who 
deliberated 
Scottish 
population 
aged 18-75* 
Gender        
Male 44% 46% 49% 
Female 55% 53% 51% 
Describes self in another way / not 
answered 1% 2% NA 
Age        
18-34 31% 32% 31% 
35-54 39% 38% 37% 
55+ 28% 29% 32% 
Prefer not to say / not answered 1% 1% NA 
Highest qualification        
Standard grade or below 29% 29% 36% 
Higher or equivalent 17% 17% 18% 
HND or equivalent 16% 16% 12% 
Degree-level or higher 28% 28% 30% 
Unsure / Refused / Not answered / 
Other 10% 10% 4% 
Sample size 969 863  
* Source for population figures: Gender and Age = NRS Mid-year population estimates 2016 (the most up to 
date estimates available at the time quotas were set). Highest qualification: Scottish Household Survey data, 
restricted to 16-74 year-olds. 
 
2.3 The trial videos 
Each mock jury watched one of two filmed case simulations of around one hour in 
length – a rape trial (in which the accused claimed that the complainer consented to 
sexual intercourse), or an assault trial (in which the accused claimed he acted in 
self-defence). Summaries of the content of the trials are included in Annex D. Short 
extracts from the trial films are available to watch online:  
• Assault trial: https://youtu.be/gxeU-sFzOxQ 
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• Rape trial: https://youtu.be/kDAGaSedje8  
• Judge’s opening and closing directions: https://youtu.be/ecemRns-gDk 
The trials were filmed by a professional film company34 at the High Court in 
Edinburgh. All roles were played by actors, with the exception of a retired judge 
who performed that ‘role’ in the films. The trials were fully scripted by the research 
team, with the scripts reviewed by members of the Scottish Government’s 
Research Advisory Group (RAG) (which included a judge, a sheriff, an advocate 
and a solicitor). A second advocate and retired sheriff, independent of the RAG, 
reviewed the scripts and observed rehearsals and filming, providing advice on 
realistic delivery to the actors.  
The legal instructions given to the jury were based on the standard directions 
recommended in the Judicial Institute for Scotland’s Jury Manual,35 supplemented 
by advice from the RAG, independent legal advisors, and the judge who performed 
that role in the films.36  
The purpose of this research was to test whether – whilst holding other aspects of 
the trial constant – the different features of the Scottish jury system appear to 
incline juries in one direction or another in terms of both verdict choice, and 
deliberation process. It also aimed to explore understandings of the not proven 
verdict in particular. The scripts for both trials were therefore deliberately drafted to 
generate a degree of ambiguity, in order to encourage debate within the jury room 
about guilt and acquittal, and to maximise the likelihood that jurors would consider 
the difference between the not guilty and not proven verdicts. 
In line with Table 2.1 above, eight versions of each trial film were produced. These 
were entirely identical (within trial type), with the exception of the very final section, 
in which the judge tells the jury about the verdicts available and the majority 
required for a verdict to be returned. When the jury was required to try and return a 
unanimous verdict, a supplementary direction from the judge was recorded (to be 
played if the jury failed to reach a verdict after 70 minutes). This indicated that a 
verdict could now be accepted provided that no more than two members of the jury 
disagreed with it (i.e. a near unanimous verdict). 
A small focus group of ‘mock jurors’ was present for the live rehearsals of each trial, 
which preceded filming. The research team also piloted the films with eight mock 
juries prior to the main fieldwork. Both exercises were used to check that 
participants found the simulations sufficiently realistic, and that they provoked an 
appropriate level of ambiguity and discussion. Minor changes were made to the 
scripts following the live rehearsals, and minor editing changes were made to one 
of the filmed case simulations following the pilot. 
                                         
34 Heehaw, based in Edinburgh. 
35 Available at http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/Upload/Documents/JuryManualFebruary2019.pdf 
36 The judge’s directions on the legal tests that should be applied were not truncated from those 
included in the Jury Manual, although the overall length of directions in any given trial will vary 
depending on the complexity of the case and the number of legal issues on which the jury requires 
to be directed. 
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2.4 The mock jury process 
The 64 mock juries took place over eight Saturdays. Four juries took place 
simultaneously (in separate rooms) in the morning, and another four in the 
afternoon. The process was as follows:  
• Jurors received a short briefing from the researcher responsible for their jury, 
took the juror affirmation, and then watched the film allocated to their jury. 
• Jurors took the standard juror affirmation.37  
• Jurors watched the trial video. 
• The researcher distributed a short self-completion questionnaire (referred to in 
this report as the ‘pre-deliberation’ questionnaire), recording jurors’ initial views 
on the appropriate verdict and their level of confidence in those views.38 The 
researcher gave any ‘spare’ jurors (in excess of the 12 or 15 required for 
deliberations) a slightly different questionnaire, which also included questions 
about the not proven verdict (asked of other jurors after deliberation).39  
• ‘Spare jurors’ were then sent home and the remaining 12 or 15 jurors were 
instructed to begin their deliberations. The researcher left the room after starting 
the audio and video-recording equipment and jurors deliberated for up to 90 
minutes.  
• Once juries indicated that they were ready to return a verdict, the researcher 
asked them who spoke for the jury, and whether they had been able to reach a 
verdict (and, for unanimity conditions, whether this was a verdict on which they 
were all agreed). 
o If a jury asked to reach a unanimous verdict was unable to do so after 70 
minutes of deliberation, they were played a supplementary video direction 
from the judge. This informed the jury that they could now return a verdict 
if ten out of 12 or 13 out of 15 jurors agreed on it. If, after a further 20 
minutes (that is, a total deliberation time of 90 minutes), the jury was still 
unable to reach a verdict, the outcome was recorded as ‘hung’. 
• Once the verdict had been recorded, the researcher administered another self-
completion questionnaire (the ‘post-deliberation’ questionnaire40), which 
covered:  
o Jurors’ individual views on the appropriate verdict, and their reasons for 
favouring that verdict. 
                                         
37 Jurors in an actual criminal case may either swear an oath or affirm: that is, “swear by Almighty 
God” or “solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm” that (in either case) they will “well and 
truly try the accused and give a true verdict according to the evidence”. A decision was taken to 
use the affirmation throughout to heighten the realism of the experience while avoiding undue 
complexity. 
38 See Annex E. 
39 See Questionnaire C in Annex E. 
40 See Annex E. 
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o Whether they had changed their mind during the course of deliberations 
and their reasons for doing so.  
o Their level of confidence in whether the jury’s verdict was the right one. 
o Their views on their ability to participate in the jury’s discussions.  
o The influence they felt they had over the jury’s decision.  
o Their level of satisfaction with the experience of being a juror.  
o Their understanding of the not proven verdict. 
o Basic demographic information about each juror (gender, age group, 
working status and highest educational qualification). 
2.5 The data 
Data from the mock juries was collected and triangulated from three main sources. 
2.5.1 Jury ‘metadata’ 
Information about each jury was recorded on a ‘jury record sheet’ by the researcher 
overseeing it.41 This included: the time the jury began deliberating, the time at 
which they returned a verdict, what that verdict was, and, for any near unanimity 
verdicts in the unanimity condition, the size of the majority. 
2.5.2 Participant (mock juror) questionnaires 
Ipsos MORI’s specialist teams scanned and edited data from the questionnaires 
that jurors completed before and after deliberating. Specialist teams also coded 
data from open-text questions, using a framework developed by the research team 
following review of a sample of the data. An SPSS (quantitative analysis software) 
data file was produced for analysis by the research team.  
2.5.3 Jury deliberations 
All deliberations were audio and video-recorded. Audio recordings were 
professionally transcribed. The research team coded their content thematically with 
the use of NVivo (qualitative analysis software), using a code frame developed by 
the team after reviewing a sample of deliberations.  
The research team also reviewed the video-recordings of the deliberations using an 
observation sheet.42 This was used both to capture the themes discussed during 
deliberations (as reflected in the NVivo coding), and to record elements of how 
juries reached their decision (for example, the tone of discussion, levels of 
participation, and numbers of dominant jurors). To ensure consistency, sheets were 
completed independently by two members of the research team for each jury.43  
                                         
41 See Annex F. 
42 See Annex G. 
43 Any discrepancies between the two were discussed and resolved, involving additional members 
of the research team where necessary to ensure consistency of approach. 
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The final data from observation sheets was merged with the jury metadata and 
questionnaire data for analysis. 
2.5.4 Data analysis and presentation 
The study generated both quantitative data (from juror questionnaires and 
metadata) and qualitative data (for example, about the ways in which not proven 
was discussed within deliberations). It also captured data at both jury and individual 
juror level.  
Any differences in the quantitative findings presented in the main body of the report 
are statistically significant (at the 5% level) unless otherwise stated.44 Further detail 
about the statistical tests applied is included in Annex H. 
2.6 Study limitations 
In comparison with many previous mock jury studies, this research was significantly 
more realistic. In particular: 
• It used filmed trials rather than transcripts, and jurors were directed on the legal 
tests to be applied. 
• It included a lengthy group discussion element (some mock jury studies either 
omit this altogether, or allow very limited time for deliberation). 
• Each mock jury included either 12 or 15 people (groups of six to eight are 
common in mock jury research, which is significantly smaller than the real juries 
the findings are intended to apply to – see Annex B for further discussion of 
methods and realism in mock jury research).  
All these elements increase the robustness of the research and the confidence that 
can be placed in its conclusions. However, as with any mock jury research, it is 
subject to several limitations that must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings. 
First, participants knew that they were not acting as jurors in a real trial. The one-
hour video simulations were engaging and benefitted from input from legal 
practitioners to maximise realism, but they inevitably involved a substantially 
streamlined account of the criminal trial, with none of the periods of delay and 
disruption that often mark real proceedings. The vast majority of mock jurors 
appeared to take the proceedings seriously – as indicated by the fact that 
discussions between jurors who disagreed regularly became animated. However, it 
is not possible in any mock jury study to control for any impact that the artificial 
nature of the experience might have had on how they deliberated or which verdict 
they returned. 
Second, sample size is a common issue in jury research and although the study 
was the largest of its type in the UK, involving almost 1,000 individual jurors, the 
                                         
44 That is, significance tests on differences reported in the text produced P-values of <=0.05, 
indicating that the probability of such a difference occurring in our sample when there is no actual 
difference in reality is less than 5%. 
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total number of juries (64) was still relatively small. As such, it is unlikely that 
anything other than large differences in verdicts between juries would have been 
picked up. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, the much larger sample of jurors 
included in this study means that it is possible to identify significant differences at 
juror level. Though translation from juror- to jury-level findings is not straightforward, 
these findings indicate the likelihood of particular features tilting juries in one 
direction or another. 
 
Third, the findings in this report are based on jurors’ responses to two specific trials. 
As discussed above,45 the trials in this research were deliberately designed to 
prompt debate between verdicts, in order to test whether, all else being equal, 
particular features (number of verdicts, etc.) influenced jurors in one direction or 
another, and to encourage discussion of the not proven verdict. The fine balance of 
the trials was therefore appropriate to the specific aims of this study. However, the 
exact pattern of verdicts returned is unlikely to reflect the pattern of verdicts that 
would be returned by juries in a wider range of differently balanced cases. Thus, 
while we can reach informed conclusions from this study on, for example, whether 
a change in the majority required would incline more jurors towards or away from a 
specific verdict, we cannot estimate the likely scale of those impacts across a larger 
number of differently balanced trials. 
 
 
                                         
45 Section 2.3. 
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3. What impact do the unique features of the 
Scottish jury system have on verdict 
choice? 
Key findings 
• There were a number of statistically significant differences at juror 
level. 
o There was an overall tendency for jurors to change from 
favouring guilty to favouring acquittal over the course of 
deliberations. However, most juries (51 of 64) in this study started 
their deliberations with a majority of jurors favouring acquittal. It is 
therefore unclear whether this reflects a tendency (noted in other 
research) for jurors to become more lenient as a result of 
deliberating, or a tendency for jurors to move towards the majority 
position (whatever that might be).    
o When the not proven verdict was available, more individual 
jurors favoured acquittal, both before and after deliberating.  
o Jurors in 15-person juries were less likely to change their minds 
about the verdict than jurors in 12-person juries.   
o Jurors asked to reach a simple majority were more likely to 
think the verdict should be guilty (after deliberating) than were 
those asked to reach a unanimous verdict.  
• As expected, due to the small number of juries in each condition, 
there were no significant differences at jury level in the proportion of 
guilty verdicts returned between juries that had the not proven verdict 
available and juries that did not, between 12 and 15-person juries, or 
between juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict and those asked to 
reach a simple majority. 
• Separate analysis of jurors in the rape and assault trials shows no 
significant difference in the proportion of rape trial jurors favouring 
guilty or acquittal verdicts by either the number of verdicts available, 
or by jury size. The finding that requiring unanimity increases the 
proportion of jurors favouring acquittal holds across both types of trial, 
however. 
• The combination of features most strongly associated with individual 
jurors favouring a guilty verdict at the end of deliberations was  
15-person, simple majority, and two verdicts. The combination in which 
jurors were least likely to favour guilty by the end of deliberations was  
12-person, unanimity, and three verdicts. Neither of these jury system 
combinations are currently used in Scotland or in England and Wales, 
although the first would represent the system in Scotland if the not proven 
verdict were abolished without any other reforms. 
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3.1 Introduction 
A central aim of this research was to understand what effect, if any, the three 
unique features of the Scottish jury system – three verdicts, 15 jurors, and the 
requirement that juries reach a simple majority (eight out of 15) before returning a 
verdict – have on jury decision-making. This chapter discusses findings on the 
effects of these unique features on verdict choice, at both jury level (verdicts 
returned by the 64 juries) and individual juror level (individual jurors’ views on what 
the verdict should be, which may differ from the verdict returned by their jury 
collectively). 
3.2 Jury versus juror-level findings 
As discussed in Chapter 1, this study is the largest mock jury study conducted in 
the UK to date. However, the total number of juries (64) is still relatively small in 
statistical terms. This means that, at the jury level, anything other than large 
differences in the likelihood of a guilty verdict being returned would not be picked 
up (as differences would need to be large to be statistically significant).  
However, we can also examine the individual verdict preferences of all 863 jurors 
who took part in the jury deliberations, based on their responses to questionnaires 
completed before and after deliberation. This juror-level analysis has the advantage 
of a considerably larger sample size, meaning there is a greater likelihood of 
identifying significant differences by the number of verdicts available, jury size, and 
majority required.  
One disadvantage of this approach is that in real trials jurors do not return verdicts 
individually – they do so collectively, after deliberation. At the same time, juries’ 
verdicts are the product of individual jurors’ views, mediated through the 
deliberation process and the rules which the jury must apply to reach their collective 
verdict. In this sample, 30 out of 32 simple majority juries (94%) returned verdicts 
which were the same as the majority preferences of individual jurors (as indicated 
in their pre-deliberation questionnaires). Similarly, of the unanimity juries who were 
able to return a verdict rather than hanging (25 of 32 juries), the choice to convict or 
acquit could have been accurately predicted from the balance of individual jurors’ 
initial verdict preferences in almost all cases (though not necessarily whether not 
guilty or not proven would be used as the means of acquittal).46 In other words, the 
majority of jury-level verdicts could have been predicted from the pre-deliberation 
responses of individual jurors.47 Examining the relationship between individual 
                                         
46 In the unanimity juries, none of the 32 juries would have been able to return a verdict on the 
basis of the jurors’ initial preferences as stated in their pre-deliberation questionnaires. There were 
no instances in which those initial preferences were unanimous, nor any in which there were only 
one or two jurors with a different view from the majority position. However, in every instance where 
a unanimity jury returned a verdict, the decision to convict or acquit (but not necessarily the choice 
of acquittal verdict) was identical to the preference of a majority of jurors prior to deliberation, aside 
from one acquittal where the jurors’ initial preferences had been split 50:50.  
47 Some support for the predictive value of individual pre-deliberation verdicts can also be found in 
previous research: Hastie and others, for example, conducted a study involving 69 juries 
comprised of 12 members. The jurors observed a simulated trial and then completed pre-
deliberation questionnaires. The researchers concluded that the most accurate model for 
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verdict preferences and the different features of the jury system in this study can 
therefore shed light on how these features might tilt jurors – and by extension, 
juries – in one direction or another.  
However, it is important to keep in mind that the precise effects that any impact on 
juror-level views will have on jury-level outcomes in any given case cannot be 
reliably predicted – it will depend on other factors, including the balance of 
evidence, the initial balance of opinion of the jury, and individual jury dynamics. It is 
not, therefore, possible to estimate the likely scale of any impact that differences at 
juror-level would have on jury-level outcomes across a larger number of differently 
balanced trials. As explained in section 2.3, the trials used in this research were 
designed to be finely balanced in order to encourage discussion of the not proven 
verdict. In practice, not all trials will be so finely balanced. 
3.3 Does jury size, the number of verdicts available, or the 
majority required make any difference to jury-level verdicts? 
Table 3.1 shows the verdicts returned by all 64 mock juries, broken down by trial 
type and by each system feature being examined (number of verdicts, jury size, 
and majority required).48 Overall, seven juries returned a guilty verdict, 26 returned 
not guilty, 24 returned not proven, and seven failed to reach a verdict within the  
90 minutes allowed for deliberation and were thus recorded as hung.  
All seven hung juries had been asked to reach a unanimous verdict, on which all (or 
almost all)49 jurors were agreed.50 The relatively high number of hung juries in this 
study is likely to reflect both the deliberately finely balanced nature of the trial 
videos (reasons for which are discussed in section 2.3), and the fact that 
deliberations were time-limited (to a maximum of 90 minutes). The findings do not, 
therefore, indicate that juries asked to reach unanimity would be expected to hang 
with this frequency in reality. Indeed, in England and Wales, where juries are 
                                         
predicting final jury level verdicts was a weighted average drawn from individual jurors’ initial 
preferences (which correctly predicted the result in 75% of cases). R Hastie, SD Penrod and N 
Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983) at 63-65. Note that none of these juries applied a simple 
majority rule, however, and so extrapolation to the Scottish context is unclear. Three different 
decision rules were applied, each by one-third of the mock juries: 12 votes out of 12, 10 votes out 
of 12 and eight votes out of 12. 
48 The table also shows the split by the number of verdicts available within trial type, jury size and 
majority required (since in each case, half the juries were asked to choose between guilty and not 
guilty, and half between guilty, not guilty and not proven). 
49 As described in Chapter 2, if juries were unable to reach a completely unanimous decision, they 
were allowed to return a verdict if either 10 out of 12, or 13 out of 15, of them could agree on it. 
50 As noted in Section 1.1 above, one distinctive feature of the Scottish jury system as it stands is 
that hung juries are impossible: the simple majority decision rule means that a verdict will always 
be reached. 
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required to try to reach unanimity,51 the proportion of juries unable to return a 
verdict is typically under 1%.52 
The pattern of verdicts reached in the two different trials shown to mock jurors was 
very similar. Across rape trial juries, there were four guilty verdicts, 12 not guilty 
verdicts, 12 not proven verdicts, and four hung juries. Across assault trial juries, 
there were three guilty verdicts, 14 not guilty verdicts, 12 not proven verdicts and 
three hung juries. 
  
                                         
51 Juries must attempt to reach unanimity but ultimately can return a verdict that 10 out of 12 of 
their members agree on. 
52 J Chalmers, “Jury majority, size and verdicts”, in J Chalmers, F Leverick and A Shaw (eds), 
Post-Corroboration Safeguards Review: Report of the Academic Expert Group (2014) 140 at 151-
152. 
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Table 3.1 – Verdicts returned by jury features 
 Guilty Not guilty Not proven Hung Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 7 26 24 7 64 
Trial type      
Rape trial (All) 4 12 12 4 32 
Rape trial, two verdicts 1 12 NA 3 16 
Rape trial, three verdicts 3 0 12 1 16 
Assault trial (All)  3 14 12 3 32 
Assault trial, two verdicts 2 12 NA 2 16 
Assault trial, three verdicts 1 2 12 1 16 
Number of verdicts      
Two verdicts (All) 3 24 NA 5 32 
Three verdicts (All) 4 2 24 2 32 
Number of jurors      
12-person juries (All) 2 13 15 2 32 
12-person, two verdicts 1 13 NA 2 16 
12-person, three verdicts 1 0 15 0 16 
15-person juries (All) 5 13 9 5 32 
15-person, two verdicts 2 11 NA 3 16 
15-person, three verdicts 3 2 9 2 16 
Majority type      
Simple majority (All) 6 14 12 NA 32 
Simple majority, two verdicts 3 13 NA NA 16 
Simple majority, three verdicts 
verdicts 
3 1 12 NA 16 
Unanimous (All) 1 12 12 7 32 
Unanimous, two verdicts 0 11 NA 5 16 
Unanimous, three verdicts 1 1 12 2 16 
 
While juries asked to choose between three verdicts were no more or less likely to 
return a guilty verdict than those with two verdicts available, when the not proven 
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verdict was an option it was almost always chosen as the means of acquittal. Of the 
32 juries asked to choose between three verdicts, 26 acquitted, and 24 of those 26 
returned a verdict of not proven.  
This pattern of acquittal verdicts is quite different to the actual pattern of acquittals 
returned in Scottish courts. In 2017-18, only 17% of all acquittal verdicts in the 
Scottish courts were not proven verdicts. However, the proportion of not proven 
verdicts returned was higher in more serious cases: for example, not proven 
accounted for 26% of all acquittals in homicide cases and 35% of all acquittals in 
rape and attempted rape cases.53 The 17% figure above includes both jury 
(solemn) and non-jury (summary) trials, while homicide and rape cases would all 
have been determined by a jury.54 The relatively low level of guilty verdicts returned 
by mock juries in this study, and the high proportion of acquittals that were not 
proven (compared with statistics for actual criminal trials in Scotland), is again likely 
to reflect the fact that the evidence in both trials was deliberately finely balanced.  
Overall, then, the verdicts returned by the 64 mock juries in this study do not show 
that any of the three unique features of the Scottish system have an effect on the 
likelihood of juries convicting an accused person. As discussed, given the sample 
size, this is not surprising. However, the findings do suggest that – at least where 
the evidence is finely balanced – juries prefer to acquit via not proven rather than 
not guilty.  
As discussed in section 3.2, the fact that there were no significant differences by 
any of the features examined at jury level is not surprising given that the number of 
juries (64) is relatively small in statistical terms. In the next section, we examine 
whether there were any differences across the much bigger sample of 863 
individual jurors who deliberated in those juries. 
3.4 Does jury size, the number of verdicts available, or the 
majority required make any difference to juror-level verdicts? 
3.4.1 Overall patterns in the verdicts favoured by individual jurors 
Before deliberating with their peers, 33% of jurors thought the jury should return a 
verdict of guilty, 42% favoured not guilty and 25% not proven. After deliberating, the 
proportion favouring a guilty verdict fell to 26%, not guilty remained the same at 
42%, and the proportion favouring not proven increased to 32%. This indicates an 
overall tendency for individual jurors to shift from favouring guilty before 
deliberating to favouring acquittal afterwards.  
                                         
53 Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2017-18 (2019) 53. Figures on the use 
of the not proven verdict in all cases prosecuted as assault (the other trial type used in this 
research) are difficult to discern as assault is included in three different categories used in the 
data. 
54 In answer to a question asked in the Scottish Parliament, it was stated that, in 2016-17, 31% of 
acquittal verdicts in solemn cases (heard by a judge and a jury) were not proven. The figures for 
the two previous years were 28% (2015-16) and 30% (2014-15). See Scottish Parliament Question 
S5W-18904. 
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The explanation for this shift to acquittal is not straightforward. As 51 of the 64 
juries in this research started out with a majority favouring acquittal, this pattern 
might reflect a tendency for jurors to move towards the majority position (in this 
case, acquittal) as a result of deliberation. However, there is a body of existing 
research that suggests that deliberating with other jurors tends to create a ‘leniency 
bias’, whereby jurors are more likely to shift position from guilty to acquittal than 
from acquittal to guilty.55 The results might reflect this tendency.  
3.4.2 Does the number of verdicts available have any impact on the verdicts 
favoured by individual jurors? 
Individual jurors were more likely to support an acquittal and less likely to 
support a guilty verdict when the not proven verdict was available. 28% of 
jurors who had three verdicts available to them thought the verdict should be guilty 
before deliberating, compared with 38% of jurors asked to choose between guilty 
and not guilty only. Post-deliberation, 22% of three-verdict jurors thought the verdict 
should be guilty, compared with 31% of two-verdict jurors. The fact that three-
verdict jurors were more likely to favour acquittal both before and after deliberating 
suggests that the availability of the not proven verdict has an effect on jurors’ 
verdict preferences independent of any impact of deliberation. 
This finding broadly reflects existing research (summarised in Chapter 1), which 
suggests – albeit not emphatically given the methodological limitations and relative 
paucity of such studies to date – that the availability of a not proven verdict may be 
associated with individual jurors being less likely to favour conviction.  
The pattern of acquittal verdicts favoured by jurors in three-verdict juries also 
reinforces the jury-level finding, above (section 3.3), that for these trials jurors had a 
clear preference for acquitting via not proven. 79% of jurors asked to choose 
between three verdicts favoured acquittal after deliberating. This 79% splits into 
65% who thought the verdict should be not proven, and 14% who thought it should 
be not guilty.  
3.4.3 Does jury size have any impact on the verdicts favoured by individual 
jurors? 
Unsurprisingly (since they had yet to discuss the trial with each other), jury size did 
not have any impact on the verdicts favoured by individual jurors before 
deliberating. However, after deliberating as a group, jurors in 12-person juries 
were less likely to think the verdict should be guilty than were jurors in 15-
person juries (21% vs 30%). This is a result of jurors in 12-person juries being 
more likely to shift towards acquittal during deliberation than those in 15-
person juries.56  
                                         
55 See e.g. the meta-analysis in RJ MacCoun and NL Kerr, “Asymmetric influence in mock jury 
deliberation: Jurors’ bias for leniency” (1988) 54 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21. 
56 In 12-person juries, 69% of jurors favoured acquittal pre-deliberation, compared to 79% post-
deliberation (a shift towards acquittal of ten percentage points). In 15-person juries 66% of jurors 
favoured acquittal pre-deliberation compared to 70% post-deliberation (a shift of only four 
percentage points) (Tables 3.2 and 3.3). 
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However, this does not necessarily indicate that 15-person juries would be more 
likely to return guilty verdicts across a larger number of differently balanced trials. 
Rather, it may reflect the fact that, where a 15-person jury is split, on average more 
people would need to shift their position to change the outcome. In 15-person 
juries, there may therefore be less motivation for those in a substantial minority 
(which, in this study, was usually those who favoured guilty) to change their 
individual position in order to bring deliberations to a close.  
3.4.4 Does the majority required have any impact on the verdicts favoured by 
individual jurors? 
The majority required did not have any impact on the verdicts preferred by 
individual jurors prior to deliberating. Again, this is unsurprising, since at that point 
jurors were unaware of how close or far away their jury might be from reaching the 
majority required to return a verdict. However, after deliberating as a group, jurors 
asked to reach a simple majority decision were more likely to think the 
verdict should be guilty than were those asked to reach a unanimous 
decision (32% vs 20%). Again, this occurred as a result of jurors in the 
unanimity condition changing their view to the majority opinion (which was, 
in most juries, to acquit) over the course of deliberating. Unsurprisingly, this 
shift to the majority view was more likely to happen when jurors had to agree 
on a unanimous verdict rather than returning a simple majority verdict.57  
In order to return a verdict, juries in a unanimity condition have to persuade jurors 
who support a minority position to shift their view, while a simple majority jury can 
return a verdict even if those in the minority do not shift at all. However, further 
analysis indicates that jurors may be less willing to move from acquittal to guilty 
when the initial balance of opinion is the other way around. In the unanimity 
condition, six juries started out with a majority for guilty, but only one of these 
actually went on to return a guilty verdict – the other five hung. In contrast, of the  
25 juries that started with a majority in favour of acquittal, 24 went on to acquit, and 
only one hung.58 
These findings also raise questions over the extent to which jurors asked to reach 
unanimity shift in order to facilitate a verdict, rather than because they have 
genuinely been convinced by the opposing arguments. Of course, it is important to 
remember that these findings are based on simulations rather than real juries. It is 
possible that, in a real trial, the inclination of jurors to shift their personal view to 
facilitate a verdict would differ. 
                                         
57 In simple majority juries, the percentage of jurors favouring acquittal was exactly the same pre- 
and post-deliberation (67%), whereas in unanimity juries 66% of jurors favoured acquittal pre-
deliberation compared to 80% post-deliberation (a shift of 12 percentage points) (Tables 3.2 and 
3.3). 
58 One unanimity jury started off with an even split between jurors favouring guilty (six) and 
acquittal (six) – this jury acquitted at the end of deliberations. 
 24 
Table 3.2 – Percentage of individual jurors personally favouring each verdict, PRE-
deliberation by experimental condition (all jurors who deliberated) 
 Conviction Acquittal  
 Guilty Acquittal 
(all forms)  
Not guilty Not proven Base 
(jurors) 
All jurors who deliberated 33% 67% 42% 25% 863 
Trial type           
Rape trial (All) 40% 59% 36% 23% 431 
Rape trial, two verdicts 44% 55% 55% NA 216 
Rape trial, three verdicts 35% 65% 18% 47% 215 
Assault trial (All) 26% 74% 48% 26% 432 
Assault trial, two verdicts 32% 68% 68% NA 216 
Assault trial, three verdicts 20% 81% 29% 52% 216 
Number of verdicts          
Two verdicts (All) 38% 62% 62% NA 432 
Three verdicts (All) 28% 73% 23% 50% 431 
Number of jurors          
12-person juries (All) 31% 69% 43% 26% 383 
12-person, two verdicts 36% 64% 64% NA 192 
12-person, three verdicts 26% 74% 23% 51% 191 
15-person juries (All) 34% 66% 42% 24% 480 
15-person, two verdicts 40% 60% 60% NA 240 
15-person, three verdicts 29% 71% 23% 48% 240 
Majority type          
Simple majority (All) 32% 67% 43% 24% 432 
Simple majority, two verdicts 37% 63% 63% NA 216 
Simple majority, three verdicts 28% 72% 23% 49% 216 
Unanimous (All) 33% 66% 41% 25% 431 
Unanimous, two verdicts 40% 60% 60% NA 216 
Unanimous, three verdicts 27% 73% 22% 51% 215 
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Table 3.3 – Percentage of individual jurors personally favouring each verdict, 
POST-deliberation by experimental condition (all jurors who deliberated) 
 Conviction Acquittal  
 Guilty Acquittal 
(all forms) 
Not guilty Not proven Base 
(jurors) 
All jurors who deliberated 26% 74% 42% 32% 863 
Trial type           
Rape trial (All) 33% 67% 36% 31% 431 
Rape trial, two verdicts 37% 63% 63% NA 216 
Rape trial, three verdicts 30% 70% 9% 61% 215 
Assault trial (All) 19% 81% 47% 34% 432 
Assault trial, two verdicts 25% 75% 75% NA 216 
Assault trial, three verdicts 13% 87% 19% 68% 216 
Number of verdicts          
Two verdicts (All) 31% 69% 69% NA 432 
Three verdicts (All) 22% 79% 14% 65% 431 
Number of jurors          
12-person juries (All) 21% 79% 40% 39% 383 
12-person, two verdicts 28% 72% 72% NA 192 
12-person, three verdicts 15% 85% 7% 78% 191 
15-person juries (All) 30% 70% 43% 27% 480 
15-person, two verdicts 33% 67% 67% NA 240 
15-person, three verdicts 27% 73% 19% 54% 240 
Majority type          
Simple majority (All) 32% 67% 39% 28% 432 
Simple majority, two verdicts 36% 64% 64% NA 216 
Simple majority, three verdicts 29% 71% 14% 57% 216 
Unanimous (All) 20% 80% 44% 36% 431 
Unanimous, two verdicts 25% 75% 75% NA 216 
Unanimous, three verdicts 14% 85% 13% 72% 215 
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3.4.5 Was the impact of the Scottish system’s unique features the same in 
the rape and assault trial? 
This research included two types of trials – a rape trial and an assault trial.59 Jurors 
in the 32 rape trial juries were more likely to think the verdict should be guilty than 
were jurors in the 32 assault trial juries, both before deliberation (40% vs 26%) and 
after (33% vs 19%). Considering these differences, the analysis above of juror 
views on the verdict was repeated separately for each type of trial.  
Differences between jurors asked to reach a unanimous verdict and those asked to 
reach a simple majority were apparent across both trial types. In each case, those 
asked to reach a simple majority were more likely to favour a guilty verdict after 
deliberating than those asked to reach unanimity. 
Both rape and assault trial jurors were less likely to favour a guilty verdict after 
deliberating when the not proven verdict was available than when it was not,60 but 
this difference between the two-verdict and three-verdict conditions was only 
statistically significant for the assault trial. Similarly, in both trials, jurors in 15-
person juries were more likely than those in 12-person juries to favour a guilty 
verdict after deliberating,61 but again this difference was only statistically significant 
for the assault trial.  
Findings for each individual trial type are based on around 430 jurors, compared 
with the full sample of 863 jurors. This means that bigger differences are required to 
reach statistical significance when analysing findings for each trial type separately.  
On the basis of this data it is not possible to conclude that availability of the not 
proven verdict or jury size made a significant difference to juror verdict preferences 
in the rape trial. However, the finding that requiring unanimity increases the 
proportion of jurors favouring acquittal holds across both types of trial. 
3.4.6 How do jury size, number of verdicts, and the majority required interact 
with each other? 
Our analysis indicates that each unique feature of the Scottish jury system was 
independently and significantly related to the likelihood of individual jurors favouring 
a guilty verdict, in the ways described above.62 However, these features are also 
                                         
59 See section 2.3. 
60 The proportions who thought the verdict should be guilty, after deliberating, were: Rape trial – 
30% (three-verdict) vs 37% (two-verdict); Assault trial –13% (three-verdict) vs 25% (two-verdict). 
61 The proportions who thought the verdict should be guilty, after deliberating, were: Rape trial – 
36% (15-person) vs 29% (12-person); Assault trial – 23% (15-person) vs 14% (12-person). 
62 This was confirmed via logistic regression, which examines whether different features are 
significantly associated with an outcome – in this case verdict – even after controlling for possible 
inter-relationships between these features. Each of the three unique features (number of verdicts, 
jury size and majority required) were included in the model, alongside trial type (rape vs assault) 
and individual jurors’ demographic characteristics (gender, age group, education level). This 
confirms that the number of verdicts is significantly and independently associated with the 
likelihood of individual jurors favouring a guilty verdict both pre- and post-deliberation, while jury 
size and majority required are significantly and independently associated with likelihood of 
favouring a guilty verdict post-deliberation (but not pre-deliberation). 
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likely to interact with each other. Table 3.4 shows differences in the proportions of 
jurors favouring a guilty verdict before and after deliberating, within each of the 
eight possible combinations of the three features. Condition F in Table 3.4 is the 
jury system presently used in Scotland (15-person, simple majority, three verdicts) 
and condition B is the jury system used in England and Wales (12-person, 
unanimity, two verdicts).  
Of the three features, the majority required has the biggest impact on the likelihood 
of individual jurors shifting towards acquittal – jurors were most likely to change 
from guilty to acquittal when required to reach a unanimous verdict. Jurors were 
less likely to think the verdict should be guilty before deliberating when the not 
proven verdict was available. However, the impact of the number of verdicts 
available was moderated during deliberations by the majority required. Regardless 
of the number of verdicts available, if the jury had to reach a unanimous verdict, 
jurors were more likely to shift to support acquittal.  
The combination of features most likely to result in individual jurors favouring a 
guilty verdict after deliberating was 15-jurors, simple majority, and two verdicts 
(condition H in Table 3.4, where 37% favoured a guilty verdict). The combination 
least likely to result in individual jurors favouring a guilty verdict after deliberating 
was 12-jurors, unanimity, and three verdicts (condition A in Table 3.4, where just 
3% favoured a guilty verdict). It should again be emphasised that these figures are 
based on two deliberately finely-balanced trials which are not representative of the 
full range of cases which come before the courts. Neither of these combinations 
represents the jury system currently used in Scotland or in England and Wales, 
although the first would be the system in Scotland if the not proven verdict were 
removed with no other changes being made. 
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Table 3.4 – Proportion of individual jurors favouring a guilty verdict pre- and post-
deliberation by combination of features 
Condition Jury 
size (15 
or 12) 
Majority 
required 
(simple 
majority or 
unanimous) 
Number 
of 
verdicts 
(3 or 2) 
Pre-
deliberation 
% guilty 
Post-
deliberation 
% guilty 
Difference 
(post 
minus 
pre) 
Base 
(jurors) 
A 12 U 3 23% 3% -20 95 
B 12 U 2 39% 21% -18 96 
C 15 U 3 30% 23% -7 120 
D 12 SM 3 29% 27% -2 96 
E 15 U 2 41% 29% -12 120 
F 15 SM 3 28% 30% 3 120 
G 12 SM 2 34% 34% 0 96 
H 15 SM 2 38% 37% -2 120 
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4 What impact do the unique features of the 
Scottish jury system have on how juries 
reach decisions? 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 indicated that each of the three unique features of the Scottish jury 
system do appear to incline jurors in particular directions in terms of their verdict 
choice. But what impact do they have on how jurors make those choices? In other 
words, what effect, if any, do they have on the collective process of deliberation? 
This chapter examines this question, drawing primarily on analysis of the recorded 
Key findings 
• Juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict deliberated for substantially 
longer than those only required to reach a simple majority. There were no 
statistically significant differences in the length of time taken to reach a 
verdict between 12-person and 15-person juries or between juries which had 
two or three verdicts available. 
• There was no statistically significant variation in the mean number of 
evidential issues raised within jury deliberations by jury size, the number 
of verdicts available, or the majority required. 
• In general, there was no statistically significant variation in whether or 
not juries discussed specific legal issues between the three features 
examined. The only exception to this was that juries asked to choose 
between two verdicts (guilty and not guilty) were more likely than those who 
also had not proven as an option to discuss the meaning of reasonable 
doubt. Jurors that discussed the meaning of the reasonable doubt standard 
of proof, however, often defined this somewhat differently to the definition 
given by the judge. 
• Jurors sometimes struggled to recollect legal tests accurately, although 
this did not vary with jury size, the number of verdicts available, or the 
majority required. Other legal misunderstandings that sometimes arose 
during deliberations included a belief that the accused is required to prove 
his innocence and a belief that self-defence is not a legitimate defence.  
• 15-person juries were associated with somewhat lower levels of juror 
participation than 12-person juries across a number of measures. 
Jurors in 15-person juries were more likely to be seen wanting to contribute 
but being unable to do so than those in 12-person juries. 15-person juries 
also included both more ‘dominant’ and more ‘minimally contributing’ jurors 
than 12-person juries. Jurors in 15-person juries (compared with 12-person 
juries) and in simple majority juries (compared with unanimity juries) felt they 
had less influence on the collective verdict outcome. 
 30 
jury discussions (which examined factors including: length of discussion, scope of 
discussion, observed level of juror participation, and tone). It also draws on jurors’ 
own perceptions of the deliberation process, based on their responses in the post-
deliberation questionnaire.63 Our analysis focuses particularly on whether there is 
any evidence that the different features of interest – number of verdicts, jury size 
and majority required – may be associated with variations in the quality of jury 
deliberation and decision-making. 
4.2 Length and scope of deliberations 
The relationship between length and quality of deliberation is not clear cut. Longer 
deliberations might reflect repetitive discussion or inefficiencies in decision-making. 
Alternatively, they might be indicative of more and better substantive discussion.  
In our study, juries were able to deliberate for up to 90 minutes before either 
returning a verdict or hanging (where a jury was required to reach near unanimity 
but failed to do so). On average, juries returned a verdict after 45 minutes (37 
minutes for the assault trial and 54 for the rape trial).  
There were no statistically significant differences in the length of time taken to 
reach a verdict between juries asked to choose between two and three verdicts, or 
between 12 and 15-person juries.64 The lack of difference in deliberation time by 
jury size contrasts with a meta-analysis of existing jury research, which suggests 
that, in general, larger juries tend to deliberate for longer.65 However, as discussed 
in Chapter 1, there is no existing research comparing 12 and 15-person juries 
specifically (comparisons tend to be between 12-person juries and smaller juries).  
Jurors asked to reach a unanimous verdict did take substantially longer over 
deliberations than those required to reach a simple majority – an average of 54 
minutes, compared with 37 minutes. However, this did not appear to be associated 
with unanimity juries having more wide-ranging discussions, at least in terms of the 
number of issues discussed. Each jury’s deliberations were coded to record 
whether or not there was discussion of different aspects of the evidence (using an 
agreed coding frame66). We found no statistically significant difference in the mean 
number of evidential issues raised between unanimity juries and simple majority 
juries.67  
We reviewed the 10 unanimity juries that deliberated for the longest period (all for 
70 minutes or longer) to see if this provided any further insight into the reasons for, 
or nature of, these longer deliberations. We were unable, however, to discern any 
clear pattern. Sometimes these lengthy deliberations were relatively disorganised; 
sometimes they reflected a clear and entrenched difference in position from the 
                                         
63 See Annex E. 
64 See Annex J, Table J.1. 
65 MJ Saks and MW Marti, “A meta-analysis of the effects of jury size” (1997) 21 Law and Human 
Behavior 451 at 458-459. However, only two of the studies which Saks and Marti reviewed 
reported data on this point. 
66 Section 2.5.3. See Annex G for further details. 
67 Neither were there any significant differences in the mean number of evidential issues raised 
between two-verdict and three-verdict juries or between 12-person and 15-person juries. 
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outset between different groups of jurors. When unanimity juries did contain strong 
differences of opinion, jurors sometimes became frustrated at being required to 
deliberate for longer when they believed that no consensus could be reached. In 
other long deliberations, there was a gradual process of jurors changing their 
position until they were able to return a verdict. 
4.3 Discussion of legal tests and issues 
In addition to coding the number of substantive aspects of the evidence discussed, 
we also recorded whether or not key legal issues mentioned in the judge’s closing 
directions to the jury were raised during deliberations. Specifically, we recorded 
whether there was: 
• Any mention of (a) either the standard of proof or the meaning of reasonable 
doubt and (b) whether the evidence was believed to have met that standard of 
proof (beyond reasonable doubt). 
• Any mention of (a) the meaning of corroboration and (b) whether the evidence 
was believed to provide corroboration for the complainer’s account. 
• In the rape trial only, any reference to each of the two legal tests for rape 
described in the judge’s directions, namely (a) whether the evidence suggested 
the complainer had consented or not, and (b) whether the accused had 
reasonable belief in her consent. 
• In the assault trial only, any reference to (a) the general plausibility of the self-
defence argument (being put forward as a special defence) and (b) each of the 
three individual tests of self-defence, namely reasonable belief in imminent 
danger of attack, violence as a last resort, and use of no more than reasonable 
force to stop an attack.68  
(For brief definitions of these terms, see the ‘key terms’ section at the start of 
this report). 
There was no statistically significant variation in whether or not juries discussed 
these legal issues by the number of verdicts available, jury size, or the majority 
required, with one exception: juries asked to choose between two verdicts were 
more likely than juries asked to choose between three verdicts to discuss the 
meaning of the reasonable doubt standard (but not whether or not this threshold 
had been reached).  
4.3.1 Reasonable doubt 
It is not obvious from the content of discussions about reasonable doubt why juries 
with only two verdict options should have been more likely to discuss its meaning. 
However, what is apparent is that where juries did discuss this, the definitions they 
reached were often more demanding than the threshold indicated by the judge.  
                                         
68 All three of these circumstances must exist for the defence to succeed, but where the defence is 
raised the burden of proof is on the prosecution to disprove the defence. If the prosecution 
disproves any one of these three circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the jury cannot hold 
that the accused acted in self-defence. 
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We found no examples of jurors referring directly to the definition of ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ provided by the judge (taken from the Jury Manual), which 
states: 
“…the Crown must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That’s a doubt, 
arising from the evidence, based on reason, not on sympathy or prejudice, or on 
some fanciful doubt or theoretical speculation. It’s the sort of doubt that would 
make you pause or hesitate before taking an important decision in the practical 
conduct of your own lives. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is less than certainty, 
but it’s more than a suspicion of guilt, and more than a probability of guilt. This 
doesn’t mean that every fact has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What it 
means is that, looking at the evidence as a whole, you’ve to be satisfied of the 
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 69 
While there were occasional references to the idea that proof beyond reasonable 
doubt is something less than complete certainty, there were repeated examples of 
other jurors referring to the perceived need to be “100%” confident or similar, which 
appears to run contrary to the judge’s direction that proof beyond reasonable doubt 
“is less than certainty”: 
“You need to believe 100% both those (prosecution) witnesses” 
(Juror, Assault trial / three-verdict / 12-person / unanimity) 
“If you’re 99 and three-quarters sure, you’ve got a quarter, you’ve got to go with 
that quarter.” 
(Juror, Assault trial / two-verdict / 15-person / unanimity) 
Thus, the finding that jurors in two-verdict juries were more likely to discuss the 
meaning of reasonable doubt does not necessarily indicate a better understanding 
or application of the standard of proof.  
4.3.2 Corroboration 
In Scots law, corroboration is required in criminal cases. Mock jurors were directed 
on this based on the guidance used by judges in directing juries in real criminal 
trials. All jurors were first told: 
“I must tell you about corroboration. The law lays down that nobody can be 
convicted on the evidence of one witness alone, no matter how strong that 
evidence may be. There must be evidence from at least two separate sources 
which you accept and which taken together point to the guilt of the accused. 
There are two essential matters that must be proved by corroborated evidence. 
These are that the crime charged was committed, and that the accused was 
responsible for committing it.” 
They were then told which facts needed to be proved by corroborated evidence 
(which varied between the two trials – assault and rape). 
                                         
69 Judicial Institute for Scotland, Jury Manual (2019) 5.15. 
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In general, jurors appeared to have fewer difficulties understanding the 
corroboration requirement than the standard of proof. However, there were 
occasional (erroneous) contributions in rape trial deliberations suggesting that the 
doctor’s forensic evidence would have to unequivocally indicate rape before the jury 
could convict.70 We identified six rape trial juries (all of which ultimately returned 
verdicts of acquittal) in which jurors appeared to suggest this. In three of these, that 
view was expressly challenged; in a fourth it was not directly challenged but other 
jurors clearly took a different view; while in the remaining two juries the 
conversation simply moved on without challenge. Jurors who challenged this view 
suggested it was unrealistic to demand such a high standard of evidence. For 
example: 
First Juror: “To me the doctor is the key person and the evidence she gave does 
not convict him.” 
Second Juror: “But, I don’t think… I would be amazed if there is a crime that 
happens anywhere in the world, that physical evidence is provided for, that the 
defence can’t turn round and say, ‘but could something else not have caused 
that injury?’ I don’t think there’s any injury that you can’t say that for.” 
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / simple majority) 
4.3.3 Trial-specific legal tests 
In all types of Scots criminal cases, juries should be convinced that the relevant 
legal tests around reasonable doubt and corroboration have been met in order to 
convict. In addition, given this study’s focus on rape and assault, our jurors were 
also required to apply legal tests linked to those specific offences. 
In the rape trial, jurors were required to assess whether the evidence suggested the 
complainer had consented, and whether it suggested the accused had a 
reasonable belief in her consent. The deliberations revealed considerable debate 
on the former, some of which reflected differing social norms about what would 
constitute evidence of free agreement to sexual intercourse.71 However, the extent 
or nature of this debate did not vary between two-verdict and three-verdict juries, 
12-person and 15-person juries, or between unanimity and simple majority juries. 
Discussion typically focused on the notion that the complainer had not suffered 
extensive injury or had not done enough to physically resist the accused (having 
said in her evidence that she had tried to push the accused off but he was too 
heavy) or on the fact she had not called for help (no evidence was presented to 
indicate whether or not there was any person who might have been able to hear 
such a call).72 Many jurors said they understood a “freeze” reaction (a term used 
repeatedly) to be common among rape victims, while others insisted this was not 
how they would have reacted.73 This is illustrated by the following exchange: 
                                         
70 For a summary of the content of the trial, see Annex D. 
71 “Free agreement” is the legal definition of consent in sexual offence cases: see Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act 2009 s 12. The jurors were told this by the trial judge. 
72 For a summary of the content of the trial, see Annex D. 
73 Where, in a jury trial for a sexual offence, it is suggested that the sexual activity took place 
without physical resistance on the part of the complainer, the judge must normally advise the jury 
 34 
First juror: “So, think of it this way, think of it this way. Imagine a Saturday night 
and somebody is out on the town and some people decide to try and assault 
them. Okay, some people might fight back, some people literally can live in a 
bubble and don't do anything about it because they're in shock and they can't 
fight back. The same could apply in that case.” 
Second juror: “Well, I'm just saying this is how I'm feeling, I'm not saying I'm right, 
but you're asking my opinion. I'm just saying, if you're being attacked and it's a 
serious assault...then to me you would scratch, you would scream, you would try 
and do anything possible to get him off.” 
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / simple majority) 
In the assault trial, jurors were required to consider the legal tests for self-defence. 
These tests were not always mentioned (of the 32 assault trial juries, 13 did not 
specifically reference all three of the tests74). Moreover, even when they were 
referenced, jurors often struggled to recollect each element clearly. In one jury, 
jurors suggested it would have been helpful to have been directed on self-defence 
before the evidence had been led, rather than after: 
First juror: “See if the judge had said that at the beginning, then you would be 
looking out for this wouldn't you, as opposed to saying at the end, what did he 
actually say? If he said to you ‘self-defence means you need to be convinced it 
was a last resort and it was their way of doing it and it was a minimum use of 
force’ and you can look...” 
Second juror: “I think we all pretty much agree with that”.  
(Assault trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
However, there was no difference in the likelihood of the self-defence tests being 
discussed by any of the features of the jury system examined in this research 
(number of verdicts available, jury size, or majority required).  
4.3.4 Supporting juror understanding 
Overall, then, these findings suggest that the number of verdicts, jury size, and 
majority required have no clear impact on the extent or accuracy of jury discussion 
of legal issues. However, they do raise important questions generally about how to 
support jurors’ understanding of those legal issues. 
This latter point is also supported by analysis of the frequency with which legal 
misunderstandings occurred (and were or were not corrected) within the 
deliberations. In addition to issues around interpreting the standard of proof and 
corroboration, discussed above, the researchers also identified two further potential 
                                         
that there can be good reasons why someone against whom a sexual offence is committed might 
not physically resist and that the absence of such resistance does not necessarily indicate that an 
allegation is false: Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 288DB, as inserted by the Abusive 
Behaviour and Sexual Harm (Scotland) Act 2016 s 6. This direction was included in the judge’s 
directions to the jury in the rape trial simulation. 
74 Though all three assault trial juries that convicted referred to all three tests. 
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legal misunderstandings that were articulated on multiple occasions across the 64 
juries.75 These were: 
• A belief that the accused was required to prove his innocence. This was directly 
contradicted in the judge’s directions, which stated, “throughout the trial every 
accused is presumed innocent unless proved guilty. The accused is not required 
to prove his innocence.” Nonetheless, this belief was expressed in 14 jury 
deliberations, though it was challenged, with varying degrees of effectiveness, in 
eight of these. 
• A belief that self-defence did not operate as a defence to assault (that is, that 
the accused in the assault trial was automatically guilty simply because he had 
stabbed the complainer). This belief was expressed in 14 assault trial 
deliberations – for example, “he has actually admitted that he stabbed him, so 
he’s guilty” – and was challenged in 10 of these.76 
There was no statistically significant variation in the frequency with which these 
misunderstandings either arose or were challenged by other jurors between two-
verdict and three-verdict juries, 12-person and 15-person juries, or unanimity and 
simple majority juries. Moreover, while we cannot know whether such 
misunderstandings influenced individual jurors’ views, there were no cases where 
the discussion and verdict expressly proceeded on the basis of such a legal 
misunderstanding. However, the fact that jurors struggled to remember legal tests 
and that legal misunderstandings arose relatively frequently across the 64 juries 
suggests a need to consider whether jurors require additional guidance to aid their 
discussion.  
Another strand of this research involved an extensive evidence review on ways of 
improving communication with juries.77 This found that written directions and 
structured decision aids can be effective in improving memory and/or 
understanding. Written directions involve giving jurors a written copy of the judge’s 
directions in the case. There is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that this 
helps jurors to remember and understand legal tests. Such improvements in 
understanding tend, however, to be limited to improvements in simple 
comprehension. In other words, they help jurors to remember and accurately re-
state legal directions. Structured decision aids (sometimes called ‘routes to verdict’) 
are documents that contain a series of primarily factual questions – which might be 
presented as written questions or in diagrammatic or flowchart form – that gradually 
lead jurors to a legally justified verdict. Evidence suggests that these are 
particularly effective at improving ‘applied’ comprehension – jurors’ ability to 
                                         
75 This excludes misunderstandings relating to the not proven verdict. Juror understanding of the 
not proven verdict is considered separately in Chapter 5. 
76 Note that it was not always clear whether particular statements reflect actual misunderstandings, 
or rather a poor articulation of a legitimate position. For example, with respect to statements that 
self-defence did not operate as a legitimate defence, it may be that in some cases jurors accepted 
the validity of the self-defence argument in principle, but viewed the degree of violence such that 
they felt the incident could not be considered self-defence – and were therefore attempting to 
short-circuit the debate since they were already convinced it was not self-defence. 
77 J Chalmers and F Leverick, Methods of Conveying Information to Jurors: An Evidence Review 
(2018).  
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correctly apply legal tests to the evidence. The evidence review found that the use 
of structured decision aids is well-established in other jurisdictions, including 
England and Wales, Canada, New Zealand and some Australian states and 
territories. 
4.4 Levels of individual juror participation 
Juries are intended to proceed on the basis of discussion between jurors about the 
evidence they have heard. The ideal is that all members of a jury are able to 
contribute freely and make their views known. The research team recorded various 
measures of juror participation in deliberations,78 including:  
• How often individual jurors were observed apparently wanting to contribute but 
being unable to do so. 
• The number of ‘dominant jurors’ in each jury (defined as “any juror who 
contributes very obviously more substantially than most other jurors”). 
• The number of ‘minimally contributing jurors’ in each jury (defined as jurors who 
made fewer than three contributions, excluding non-verbal contributions (e.g. 
nodding), simple agreement (e.g. ‘yes, I agree’ with no expansion), or very short 
contributions made only as part of ‘going around the table’ to establish each 
juror’s view on what verdict they should return). 
These are imperfect measures. The concept of a ‘dominant juror’, for example, is 
often used to imply an inappropriate dominance of discussion at the expense of 
others, but is used more neutrally here, simply to identify those who spoke very 
substantially more than others. Similarly, we could only record instances where 
jurors visibly appeared to be trying to speak but were interrupted or spoken over by 
others – we could not capture occasions where jurors wanted to contribute but kept 
silent. Nonetheless, when taken together, and in combination with jurors’ own views 
on the deliberation process (captured in the questionnaires they completed after 
deliberating), they provide an insight into patterns of participation. 
Across a number of these measures, there was evidence of jurors being less able 
to participate in 15-person juries compared with 12-person juries: 
• Jurors were more likely to be observed wanting to contribute, but being unable 
to do so, in 15-person juries (13 out of 32 juries) compared with 12-person juries 
(2 out of 32 juries). 
• There were more dominant jurors, on average, in 15-person juries (1.8 jurors) 
than in 12-person juries (1.0 jurors). Jurors in 15-person juries were also more 
likely to agree that “some members of the jury talked too much” (41% of jurors in 
15-person juries, compared with 28% in 12-person juries). 
• There were more minimally contributing jurors, on average, in 15-person juries 
(2.5 jurors) than in 12-person juries (1.6 jurors). 
• Jurors in 15-person juries also gave lower ratings of their own influence over the 
verdict in comparison with jurors in 12-person juries. When asked to rate their 
influence on a scale from 1 (none at all) to 7 (a great deal), jurors in 15-person 
                                         
78 For more details on the how these aspects were recorded and analysed, see Annex G. 
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juries had an average rating of 4.1, compared with 4.5 among those in 12-
person juries.79 
The fact that 15-person juries contain more dominant and minimally contributing 
jurors might be expected simply by virtue of the larger group size. However, in 
combination these findings suggest that bigger juries may be associated with more 
jurors struggling to participate fully, and consequently with jurors feeling they have 
less influence on the final decision. It is also worth noting that, when reviewing 15-
person juries, it was common for the research team to observe side conversations 
running concurrently within discussions. It was also common to note high levels of 
interruption and speaking over one another in 15-person juries, leading to a 
decreased sense of order within the deliberations overall. 
There were no statistically significant differences in observed levels of juror 
contribution between unanimity juries and simple majority juries. However, there 
were some differences in jurors’ own perceptions of their participation. Jurors who 
were asked to come to a simple majority verdict: 
• Were more likely to disagree that they had felt able to say as much as they 
wanted (10% vs 5%). 
• Were less likely to agree that they felt fully involved in the jury’s decision (86% 
vs 92%). 
• Gave lower ratings, on average, of their own influence over the verdict (4.1 
among jurors asked to reach a simple majority vs 4.5 among jurors asked to 
reach a unanimous verdict). 
In combination with the longer average deliberation time for unanimity juries, these 
findings suggest that requiring unanimity may provide more opportunity for 
everyone to feel they have been able to put their views across. This is consistent 
with previous research. For example, the Inside the Jury study compared 12-person 
juries that were required to reach either unanimity, 10 votes out of 12 or eight votes 
out of 12. The study found that, while there were no statistically significant 
differences in the frequency of jurors’ participation, the relatively shorter 
deliberation time for juries deliberating under the 8/12 and 10/12 conditions meant 
that minimally participating jurors appeared much more frequently in those juries 
than in unanimous juries.80 
There were no clear differences in observed or self-assessed juror participation and 
influence between two-verdict and three-verdict juries.81  
                                         
79 See tables J.2 to J.6 in Annex J for full data. 
80 R Hastie, SD Penrod and N Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983) 91-92. 
81 While not the main focus of our research questions, there were some statistically significant 
differences in observed and self-assessed juror participation between the rape and assault trials. It 
is not appropriate to generalise from these, since they reflect the particular nature and content of 
the two trials in question. However, in summary: there were more minimally contributing and 
dominant jurors in assault trial juries and jurors were more often observed apparently wanting to 
contribute but being unable to do so in assault trial juries. But there were no statistically significant 
differences in jurors’ own perceptions of their influence over the verdict, or their perceptions of 
whether other jurors spoke too much, between the two types of trial.  
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4.5 Observed tone and juror feelings about deliberations 
The function of a jury is to come to a verdict based on a clear assessment of the 
evidence. Whether this process is calm or fraught, and whether jurors enjoy the 
experience are not primary considerations. However, in the context of attempting to 
understand how different features of the jury system might impact on the process of 
decision-making, the overall tone of discussions is potentially relevant, as is jurors’ 
own level of confidence in the verdict returned. 
The research team coded 27 of the 64 deliberations as ‘almost always completely 
calm’, 22 as ‘occasionally heated or animated’ and 15 as ‘frequently heated or 
animated’. Based on this data, there was no clear, statistically significant difference 
in tone of deliberations between two-verdict and three-verdict juries. However, 15-
person juries, and juries asked to reach unanimity, were each marginally more 
likely to become frequently heated or animated.82 
Of course, designating a tone for the jury as a whole can be misleading, as the 
temperature of a discussion can fluctuate. Further analysis of researchers’ notes on 
deliberation videos suggests that such fluctuations were particularly apparent in 
juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict, but where deeply entrenched 
differences between the jurors meant that the jury was struggling to agree. In these 
juries, exchanges tended to become more animated in the later stages of 
deliberation, when time was running out, even amongst those coded as only 
‘occasionally more heated’ overall.  
Overall, 81% of jurors said they were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ confident that their jury had 
reached the right verdict. Unsurprisingly, juror confidence varied substantially 
depending on whether or not individual jurors personally agreed with the collective 
verdict returned. 93% of those who personally agreed with the jury’s final verdict83 
were confident it was the right decision, compared with just 38% of those who did 
not. A related finding is that jurors required to reach unanimity were somewhat 
more likely to express confidence in the final verdict (87%, compared with 76% of 
jurors asked to reach a simple majority). Again, this is unsurprising since requiring 
unanimity means that jurors are more likely to agree with the verdict returned at the 
end of deliberations. Jurors asked to choose between three verdicts were also a 
little more likely to express confidence in their jury’s decision (83%, compared with 
78% of jurors asked to choose between two verdicts).84 There was no statistically 
significant variation in juror confidence in the verdict between 12-person and 15-
person juries.85  
Finally, jurors were asked (after deliberating) how satisfied they felt with the 
experience of being a (mock) juror. Overall, levels of satisfaction were very high – 
88% were very or fairly satisfied with the experience. Of course, the voluntary (and 
moderately remunerated) nature of this mock jury research means that this finding 
                                         
82 See Annex J, Table J.7. 
83 Based on comparing what they personally said the verdict should be in their post-deliberation 
questionnaire with the verdict returned. 
84 See Annex J, Table J.8. 
85 While not directly relevant to the research questions, it is worth noting that confidence in the 
verdict was significantly higher among assault trial jurors (89%) than among rape trial jurors (73%). 
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is unlikely to transfer to the ‘real’ courtroom. What is of relevance is whether there 
were any differences by jury size, number of verdicts, or majority required. The only 
significant difference in this respect was that jurors asked to choose between two 
verdicts were slightly more likely to indicate that they had been dissatisfied with the 
experience than were jurors asked to choose between three verdicts (6% vs 3%).
 40 
5 How do jurors understand the not proven 
verdict?  
Key findings 
• The meaning and consequences of the not proven verdict were rarely 
discussed at any length in deliberations, even in those juries where that 
verdict was returned. 
• Where the not proven verdict was discussed, there was inconsistency 
in understanding of its meaning and confusion over its effect. In 
particular, jurors were not always clear how it differed (if at all) from a not 
guilty verdict. 
• The judge’s direction that “not guilty and not proven have the same 
effect, acquittal, which means that the accused cannot be tried again 
for the same offence” does appear to increase juror understanding. 
Jurors in two-verdict juries, who did not receive this direction, were more 
likely than juries in three-verdict juries to think that the accused can be 
retried if the verdict is not proven.  
• The idea that the not proven verdict means the accused is guilty, but 
that guilt has not been proven to the necessary standard for 
conviction, arose frequently (though usually briefly) during 
deliberations. Jurors also expressed the view that there is a lingering 
stigma attached to a verdict of not proven. 
• Related to this, jurors choosing the not proven verdict tended to base 
their decision on a belief that that the evidence did not prove guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt, or on the difficulty in choosing between two 
competing accounts. 
• Jurors choosing the not guilty verdict (where both acquittal verdicts 
were available), in contrast, tended to base this on a belief that the 
accused was innocent, or some aspect of the complainer’s or witness’ 
evidence that suggested that they were not giving a truthful account. 
• More jurors thought that a verdict of not proven should be returned 
when jurors need to compromise to reach a verdict than believed a not 
guilty verdict should be used in that situation. However, there was also a 
view that the not proven verdict was a “cop out”. 
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5.1 Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, Scottish juries are unique in that they have two verdicts of 
acquittal open to them: not guilty and not proven. The legal consequences of the 
two verdicts are exactly the same – the accused is cleared of the charges and 
cannot normally be re-prosecuted for the same offence.86 The not proven verdict’s 
existence in Scots law has been described as a “historical accident”.87 There were 
no set forms of verdict used by early juries: their role was simply to decide on the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. The role of the jury was altered in the early  
17th century by a change in procedure whereby juries ceased to declare accused 
persons guilty or innocent, and instead returned ‘special verdicts’ considering 
whether individual factual allegations were proven or not proven. The decision on 
the guilt or innocence of the accused was then taken by the judge presiding over 
the case. In 1728, a landmark legal case (the trial of Carnegie of Finhaven) re-
established the jury’s right to return a verdict of not guilty, rather than leaving that 
decision to the judge. By the 19th century, lawyers had come to view the old 
‘special verdicts’ as irrelevant. ‘Not proven’, however, had become something of a 
legal fixture, and juries continued to use it alongside ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’. This 
was not in its original meaning, where ‘not proven’ referred to a failure to prove 
individual facts, but as one of two acquittal verdicts that both meant a failure to 
prove guilt. The not proven verdict as it is used today is not defined in statute or 
case law. It is simply one of two possible acquittal verdicts and the standard text on 
Scottish criminal procedure states that juries should not be told anything about its 
meaning.88 
This chapter presents findings on how jurors understand the not proven verdict and 
why they might choose it over the other verdicts available to them. It draws on data 
from two sources: individual questionnaires completed by jurors before and after 
their deliberations, and the jury deliberation transcripts and videos.  
Of the 64 mock juries in our study, half (32) had two verdicts open to them (that is, 
they could only return a verdict of guilty or not guilty) and half were able to choose 
between three verdicts (guilty, not guilty or not proven). In his final directions to 
jurors, the judge in the trial films told them which verdicts were available to them. 
Jurors in two-verdict juries were told simply that there were two verdicts open to 
them – guilty and not guilty. In three-verdict juries, jurors were given additional 
direction on the not proven verdict, based on the guidance given to Scottish judges 
for directing juries in real trials, as follows: 
“Finally, I need to tell you that there are three verdicts you can return on this 
charge: not guilty, not proven, or guilty. Not guilty and not proven have the same 
                                         
86 The precise legal position regarding re-prosecution is described in more detail in section 5.4.2 
below. 
87 I Willock, The Origins and Development of the Jury in Scotland (Stair Society, 1966) 217. The 
explanation of the history of the not proven verdict that follows is drawn from Willock’s book. 
88 GH Gordon, Renton and Brown: Criminal Procedure according to the Law of Scotland, 6th edn 
(1996) para 18-79.41. 
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effect, acquittal, which means that the accused cannot be tried again for the 
same offence.” 89 
Aside from this direction, jurors were told nothing about the not proven verdict. If 
jurors did ask questions about it, the researchers told them that they were unable to 
provide any further guidance. The not proven verdict was not mentioned at all in the 
questionnaire that jurors completed prior to deliberating, except that jurors were 
asked to state what they thought the verdict should be (so jurors in three-verdict 
juries had the option of choosing not proven). After deliberating, however, jurors in 
both two-verdict and three-verdict juries were asked a number of questions about 
their understanding of the not proven verdict. A questionnaire with the same 
questions about the not proven verdict was also completed by ‘spare’ jurors (those 
who watched the trial videos but who were not needed for the deliberations).90 
Subsequent references to post-deliberation questionnaire data therefore includes 
the responses of these ‘spare’ jurors as well as those who actually deliberated. 
5.2 Extent of discussion of not proven during deliberations 
The research team coded the level of discussion of not proven’s meaning or 
consequences in each jury deliberation, recording whether this was discussed “in 
some detail”, only “minimal references” were made, or it was not discussed at all.  
Across the study it was rare for any very lengthy discussion of the not proven 
verdict to take place, even in juries where that verdict was ultimately returned. The 
code “in some detail” therefore covered anything other than the most minimal 
discussion. 
There were no statistically significant differences in the level of discussion of not 
proven between 12 and 15-person juries, or between juries asked to reach a 
unanimous verdict and those required to reach a simple majority (see Annex J, 
Table J.9). Juries in rape trials were marginally more likely than their assault trial 
counterparts to discuss not proven “in some detail”, although they were no more 
likely to return a verdict of not proven at the end of the deliberation process.91 
Unsurprisingly, however, the not proven verdict was much more likely to be 
discussed “in some detail” by juries that had it available to them. In 11 of the 32 
three-verdict juries, the not proven verdict was discussed “in some detail”. Most of 
those juries (nine out of the 11) were juries in which a not proven verdict was 
returned. However, in five of the 32 three-verdict juries there was no discussion at 
all of the meaning or consequences of the not proven verdict, despite the fact that, 
in four out of these five, a not proven verdict was ultimately returned. Moreover, in 
two out of these five juries, several jurors switched their verdict from either guilty or 
not guilty to not proven during the course of the deliberations.92 There was no 
                                         
89 The direction was taken from the Judicial Institute for Scotland’s Jury Manual (2019). 
90 See Annex E for details of the different questionnaires. For an explanation of ‘spare’ jurors, see 
section 2.4. 
91 See section 3.4. 
92 Five of 15 in one of the juries and four of 15 in the other. As discussed in section 5.5.1, however, 
jurors rarely gave explicit reasons for switching verdict. 
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obvious pattern in terms of trial type, majority required, or length of deliberation to 
the five juries where the not proven verdict was not discussed at all.93  
It is notable that there was also at least some discussion of the not proven verdict in 
half (16 of 32) of juries in the two-verdict condition, despite there having been no 
mention of it in the judge’s directions or pre-deliberation questionnaire. This 
indicates that there is wider awareness of the not proven verdict among the general 
public. The nature of this discussion was either simply to point out that a not proven 
verdict would normally be available in a Scottish criminal trial, or to lament the fact 
that it was not available to them – usually because jurors were finding it difficult to 
decide on a verdict. For example:  
“I don't think there is enough evidence against [the accused], and that's it in a 
nutshell, it's quite clear. I would like to have a not proven verdict or something 
like that but can only go for not guilty.”  
(Assault trial / two-verdict / 15-person / unanimity) 
5.3 Self-assessed understanding of not proven 
After returning a verdict, all jurors were asked to assess how well they felt they 
understood the not proven verdict (on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 was “I do not 
understand the not proven verdict at all” and 7 was “I fully understand the not 
proven verdict”). Of course, self-assessed understanding does not necessarily 
equate to actual understanding.94 The ways in which jurors actually understood the 
not proven verdict are explored in the next section of this chapter (5.4). However, 
51% of all jurors felt that they ‘fully understood’ the not proven verdict.  
Self-assessed understanding of not proven was higher in three-verdict juries (58% 
indicated that they fully understood the verdict, compared to 45% in two-verdict 
juries).95 There were no statistically significant differences in average levels of self-
assessed understanding of not proven by gender, age, education level, trial type, 
jury size or majority required.  
During deliberations, jurors sometimes expressed uncertainty or confusion about 
the not proven verdict. In nine of the 32 three-verdict juries, jurors either stated that 
they did not understand the not proven verdict or asked other jurors (or in one case, 
                                         
93 Four of the five were assault trial juries; one was a rape trial jury. Four were simple majority 
juries; one was a unanimity jury. Two of the juries involved very short deliberations (19 minutes 
and 24 minutes), indicating that discussion generally (i.e. not just of the not proven verdict) was 
limited. The other three had deliberation times of 35 minutes, 41 minutes and 50 minutes. 
94 Research suggests that jurors think they understand legal concepts better than they actually do 
and that confidence does not necessarily equate to accuracy: see L Hope, N Eales and A Mirashi, 
“Assisting jurors: promoting recall of trial information through the use of a trial‐ordered notebook” 
(2014) 19 Legal and Criminological Psychology 316 at 326 and B Saxton, “How well do jurors 
understand jury instructions? A field test using real juries and real trials in Wyoming” (1998) 33 
Land and Water Law Review 59 at 92. 
95 This mirrors the findings of Hope and others’ research (cited in section 1.2.2), where self-
assessed understanding of the not proven verdict was also significantly higher among jurors who 
had been directed on the verdict than those who had not – see study 1 (at 246) and study 2 (at 
249). 
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the researcher) what it meant. The nature of their uncertainty varied. In one jury, it 
was centred on whether not proven was actually a verdict of acquittal: 
“Well, acquitting is not ‘not proven’, that’s not guilty.” 
“Is that not guilty?” 
“No, that's not proven, you must acquit..So, basically not saying he was guilty.” 
“So, you add the not proven and not guilty together.” 
“I don't understand that.”  
(Assault trial / three-verdict / 12-person / simple majority) 
In two other juries, jurors expressed uncertainty about whether not proven and not 
guilty are the same thing, or whether not guilty differs because it requires proof of 
innocence.96 In another, a juror asked whether not proven would automatically be 
the verdict if the jury was split 50/50 between acquittal and conviction. Thus, while 
the judge’s instructions appear to go some way to improving juror understanding of 
the not proven verdict, a lack of clarity about its precise meaning and use persisted 
among some jurors.  
It should be stressed, though, that while there was some uncertainty over the 
meaning of the not proven verdict, jurors relatively rarely expressed beliefs about 
the verdict that were definitively incorrect. This is in part because, as noted earlier, 
the not proven verdict does not have a specific definition beyond it being one of two 
verdicts of acquittal. This leaves room for a number of different understandings of 
its meaning and purpose, which are explored below. 
5.4 Specific understandings of the not proven verdict and its 
consequences 
After deliberating, jurors were asked a number of questions about the not proven 
and not guilty verdicts as part of the post-deliberation questionnaire. These were 
designed to explore their understanding of the differences between the two 
acquittal verdicts, and why jurors might choose one over another. This section 
reports on findings from these questions and on the various ways in which the not 
proven verdict was discussed during deliberations.  
5.4.1 “Guilty, but you can’t prove it” 
The idea that the not proven verdict should be used if jurors suspect the accused is 
guilty, but feel that this has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, was the 
most prominent theme in both the deliberations and questionnaire responses.  
A majority (70%) thought that if a jury thinks the accused is guilty, but do not think 
the evidence proves it beyond reasonable doubt, they should return a verdict of not 
proven. Just 7% said that it does not matter which of not proven or not guilty is 
returned, and 12% that the jury should return a verdict of not guilty (Figure 5.1). The 
view that not proven is the most appropriate verdict if jurors think the accused is 
guilty but the standard of proof has not been met was more common among: rape 
                                         
96 A point that is returned to later – see section 5.4.5. 
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trial jurors than assault trial jurors (75% compared to 64%); jurors who had the not 
proven verdict available during their deliberations compared with those asked to 
choose between guilty and not guilty (77% compared 63%); and jurors asked to 
reach a simple majority compared with those asked to reach a unanimous verdict 
(73% compared to 66%).97  
Figure 5.1: Juror views on the appropriate verdict if they think the accused is guilty 
but the evidence does not prove it beyond reasonable doubt 
 
Base: All jurors (n = 969) 
 
The view that not proven should be used when the jury thinks the accused is guilty 
but that the evidence does not meet the required standard of proof was also voiced 
during deliberations – 31 such statements were made across 14 of the 32 three-
verdict juries.98 For example: 
 
First juror: “Not guilty is completely different to not proven.” 
Second juror: “Not proven is guilty, but you can’t prove it.” 
First juror: “Not officially.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / simple majority) 
5.4.2 “Not proven means you could still be brought back to trial” 
As noted above (section 5.1), jurors in the three-verdict juries were told by the 
judge that “not guilty and not proven have the same effect, acquittal, which means 
that the accused cannot be tried again for the same offence”. Jurors in the two-
verdict juries did not receive this direction. 
                                         
97 See Annex J, Table J.10. 
98 There were also 10 statements to this effect across six of the 32 two-verdict juries. 
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In fact, the legal position regarding retrial following an acquittal verdict is now 
slightly more complex than this direction implies. Since the Double Jeopardy 
(Scotland) Act 2011 came into force, the prosecution can apply for permission to re-
prosecute following an acquittal, although only in limited circumstances (primarily 
where either the acquitted person has subsequently admitted to committing the 
offence or, in serious cases, where fresh evidence has arisen that substantially 
strengthens the case against them).99 Analysis of the deliberations indicated that a 
small number of jurors in this study were aware of these provisions. The important 
point, however, is that such an application for re-prosecution can be made 
regardless of whether the verdict is not guilty or not proven. There is thus no 
difference between the two acquittal verdicts in relation to the possibility of retrial. 
Our mock jurors were much more likely to think that a retrial was possible after a 
not proven verdict than after a not guilty one – 41% thought it was definitely or 
probably true that ‘the accused can be tried again’ after a not proven verdict 
compared with 23% who thought the same applied after a not guilty verdict (Figure 
5.2). 
Figure 5.2: Jurors’ understanding of the not proven and not guilty verdicts’ effects 
(% saying statements definitely or probably true) 
 
 
Base: All jurors (n = 969) 
 
The judge’s direction does, however, appear to improve jurors’ understanding of 
this issue. Jurors in two-verdict juries (who were not directed on this point by the 
judge) were much more likely than those in three-verdict juries (who were directed) 
to think that the position on retrial was different for each acquittal verdict (Figure 
5.3). This is consistent with the findings of Hope and others, in which jurors who 
had been directed on the not proven verdict were significantly less likely to believe 
                                         
99 See Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act 2011 sections 3 and 4. 
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that the accused could be re-tried for the same offence following a not proven 
verdict.100 However, even in three-verdict juries, jurors were still more likely to say 
someone can be retried after a not proven verdict (26%) than after a not guilty 
verdict (20%) (Figure 5.3). Some confusion about the possibility of a retrial with 
each verdict appears, therefore, to persist. There were no statistically significant 
differences in views about the possibility of retrial by jury size or by majority 
required.  
Figure 5.3: Juror beliefs about the possibility of retrial after (a) not proven and (b) 
not guilty verdicts, by whether they were asked to choose between two or three 
verdicts 
 
 
Bases: All jurors – two-verdict jurors = 484, three-verdict jurors = 485 
 
Whether the accused could be retried following a not proven verdict was also raised 
repeatedly during deliberations. In total, 21 statements on this topic were made 
across 12 of the 32 three-verdict juries: 11 expressing the view that this was 
possible, and 10 expressing the view that it was not.101 Jurors’ claims that an 
accused person can be retried following a not proven verdict were not always 
clearly incorrect, given the possibility of retrial under the Double Jeopardy 
(Scotland) Act 2011. However, in five cases (in five different juries), jurors wrongly 
claimed that retrial is possible following a not proven verdict, but not following a 
verdict of not guilty: 
 
“Not proven means that you could still be brought back to trial again. Not guilty 
means you can’t.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / unanimity)  
                                         
100 Hope and others (see citation in section 1.2.2) at 249. The difference was even more stark in 
her study, with 37% of three-verdict participants believing the accused could be re-tried for the 
same offence following a verdict of not proven, compared to 87% of two-verdict participants. 
101 Seven statements were also made in the two-verdict juries (six expressing the view that retrial 
was possible after a not proven verdict). 
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Only one of these five statements was corrected by another juror, but this did not 
seem to be effective, as the juror who made the original statement went on to 
express the incorrect belief again.  
All of these statements about not proven and the possibility of retrial occurred in the 
context of general discussions about not proven’s meaning and how it might differ 
from not guilty. There were no examples of jurors referring explicitly to the 
possibility of retrial as a factor that led them to choose one verdict over the other, 
although it is, of course, possible that this influenced their decision. 
5.4.3 “The middle ground” 
When asked which verdict should be used ‘when the jurors need to compromise to 
decide on a verdict’ significantly more jurors selected not proven than not guilty 
(31% compared to 17%, respectively) (Figure 5.2, above). 
The notion of not proven as a ‘compromise verdict’ also arose during deliberations, 
with statements to this effect made in five of the three-verdict juries.102 All five of 
these juries ultimately returned a not proven verdict. This view of the not proven 
verdict was sometimes linked with an expression of relief that the verdict was 
available as a way of ending deliberations: 
 
“ … if you didn't have the not proven verdict and you either had to find him guilty 
or not guilty then ...” 
“We would be here all week.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / unanimity) 
However, there were also examples of jurors describing the not proven verdict as a 
“cop-out”, suggesting that it excused the jury from deliberating more fully or from 
making a more difficult decision: 
 
“ … it's a bit of a cop out, rather than people really considering things really, 
really, carefully”.  
(Rape trial / two-verdict / 12-person / unanimity) 
“… most people go for the middle ground because it's the easiest option and I 
think the danger of a situation like this, is that because you're not 100 per cent 
sure, which none of us are, you're just thinking it's safer just to say not proven …”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
5.4.4 “If you've got a not proven for rape on your criminal record you're not 
working anywhere” 
A verdict of not proven is a verdict of acquittal. It would not, therefore, form part of 
the accused’s record of criminal convictions held by the court (which is given to the 
                                         
102 And in four of the two-verdict juries. In the two-verdict juries, this was always in the context of 
jurors wishing that the not proven verdict was available to them, so that they could more easily 
reach a verdict. 
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judge to take into account in sentencing if the accused is ever convicted of a 
subsequent offence).  
Despite a not proven verdict not being a conviction, it is possible that information 
about it could be disclosed to future employers as part of a Protecting Vulnerable 
Groups (PVG) background check.103 This could occur if the fact of the not proven 
verdict has been recorded by the police and is considered by them to be relevant to 
the purpose of a PVG check under the relevant legislation (section 47 of the 
Protection of Vulnerable Groups (Scotland) Act 2007). The treatment of the not 
proven verdict in this way is no different from the not guilty verdict – either could 
potentially be disclosed as part of a PVG check in certain circumstances.  
When asked directly (in the post-deliberation questionnaire), mock jurors did not 
appear to draw any significant distinction between not proven and not guilty in 
terms of their implications for the accused’s criminal record. There was no 
statistically significant difference in the (relatively low) proportions of jurors who 
thought that the accused would get a criminal record following a not proven 
compared to a not guilty verdict (11% for not proven vs 8% for not guilty – see 
Figure 5.2).  
This finding sits slightly at odds, however, with analysis of the content of jury 
deliberations. Although statements about the effect of a not proven verdict on the 
accused’s criminal record were relatively rare, there was some evidence of 
misunderstanding. Ten statements were made on this topic across five of the 32 
three-verdict juries.104 Six out of 10 statements implied that a not proven verdict 
would result in a criminal record, and four that it would not. Of the six statements 
indicating that a not proven verdict would appear on the accused’s criminal record, 
four could be classed as definitely incorrect – they wrongly stated that if the 
accused was tried for a different criminal offence in the future, the jury would be told 
about the previous not proven verdict.105 The two other statements referred to the 
perceived effect a not proven verdict might have on subsequent employment. One 
made brief reference to possible disclosure of a not proven verdict to potential 
employers, while the other was a longer passage of discussion, starting with the 
following claim: 
“If you've got a not proven for rape on your criminal record, you're not working 
anywhere, or you have no life anyway, so you're going to suffer anyway.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / unanimity) 
This was followed by a debate about whether someone who had received a not 
proven verdict would have to disclose this to future employers. No definitive 
conclusion was reached and the discussion moved on, with no further reference to 
this issue.  
                                         
103 The Protecting Vulnerable Groups (PVG) check is a scheme intended to ensure that people 
whose behaviour makes them unsuitable to work with children and/or protected adults are 
prevented from doing 'regulated work' with these vulnerable groups. 
104 Nothing was said about an impact upon criminal records in the two-verdict juries. 
105 This is incorrect as previous acquittals (and convictions) are generally inadmissible evidence in 
a Scottish criminal trial. 
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This pattern was common across other juries that discussed the perceived 
implications of not proven for the accused’s ‘record’ – regardless of whether 
incorrect statements were corrected, the issue did not appear to have any bearing 
on subsequent discussions. Overall then, while there is evidence that some jurors 
may mistakenly believe a not proven verdict has different implications to not guilty 
for the accused’s record, this did not appear to be an explicit driver for choosing 
one acquittal verdict over another (although again, it is impossible to know if 
individual jurors may have been influenced by this belief but did not voice that 
during deliberations). 
5.4.5 “Not proven means the jury feel that they cannot prove the person is 
innocent” 
The idea that a not proven verdict should be used when the accused has not 
‘proved his innocence’ arose in 10 of the 32 three-verdict juries, with 15 statements 
made to this effect.106 There is, of course, no requirement to ‘prove’ innocence in 
legal proceedings, and all juries were directed on this by the trial judge:107 
“I now deal with some fundamental principles of law that apply in every case. The 
first is this. Throughout the trial every accused is presumed innocent unless 
proved guilty. The accused is not required to prove his innocence. Secondly, it’s 
for the Crown to prove the guilt of the accused on the charge he faces. If that’s 
not done an acquittal must result. The Crown have the burden of proving guilt. 
Thirdly, the Crown must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.” 
Nonetheless, it was apparent that some jurors felt not proven should be used when 
innocence has not been ‘proved’: 
“[Not proven] means that the jury feel that they cannot prove that the person is 
innocent, it means that they don't think...they think that there has possibly been a 
rape, but they don't feel that the evidence is strong enough.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 12-person / simple majority)  
In some instances, jurors distinguished between the not proven and not guilty 
verdicts in precisely these terms (that is, that not guilty indicates that the accused 
has proven their innocence, whereas not proven indicates that they have not): 
“ … the difference between not proven and not guilty is not guilty is you believe 
there is evidence to prove that he is not guilty.” 
“But, the outcome is the same.” 
“The outcome from our perspective is the same.”  
(Assault trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
In the jury quoted above, this assertion led to a short debate, with another juror 
disagreeing that the not proven and not guilty verdicts differed in this way. Despite 
this, the juror who expressed the initial view then repeated it, stating that: 
                                         
106 Statements to this effect were also made in two of the 32 two-verdict juries. 
107 See Judicial Institute for Scotland, Jury Manual (2019) 5.15. 
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“Not guilty is there is evidence to prove that he did not do what they were 
accused of. Guilty is there is evidence that tells you. Not proven tells you there is 
no evidence.”  
(Assault trial / three-verdict /15-person / simple majority) 
Discussion then moved on and the point was not discussed again (the jury 
ultimately returned a majority not proven verdict). In two other juries where this view 
was expressed, other jurors also interjected to disagree and challenge (in both 
cases referring to the judge’s direction that the accused is innocent until proven 
guilty), but the point was not discussed further in either case, which makes it 
difficult to assess what impact such views had on the verdict these juries returned. 
However, there were examples where a belief that the accused had not proved 
their innocence appeared to be one reason why individual jurors favoured a not 
proven verdict over one of not guilty: 
“I couldn’t say he was innocent and let it go, but I couldn’t say he done it, it was 
right in the centre for me.” 
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
5.4.6 “You’ve got a black mark against you” 
A final theme that emerged during deliberations was the perception that there is an 
element of stigma attached to a not proven verdict. Seven statements were made 
to this effect across six of the 32 three-verdict juries (four in assault trial juries; three 
in rape trial juries).108 It was suggested that a not proven verdict means “you've got 
a black mark against you”, or that “doubt” would exist in people’s minds about 
whether the accused was guilty. This perceived ‘stigma’ was linked with the view 
(discussed in 5.4.1) that juries should return a not proven verdict when they think 
the accused is guilty, but the evidence does not prove this beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
“You walk away innocent, but everybody knows.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
In all these cases, it was clear that jurors understood the legal position (that a 
verdict of not proven is a verdict of acquittal), but that despite this, they felt there 
would be a lingering stigma attached to such a verdict. 
Beliefs about the perceived ‘stigma’ of a not proven verdict were explicitly cited by 
three jurors as a reason why they favoured a particular acquittal verdict. All three 
were rape trial jurors. Two jurors (in different juries) stated that they supported a not 
guilty verdict over one of not proven because, as one put it, they were “not 
prepared to imply someone’s committed rape”. Conversely, the third juror stated 
that their choice of not proven was intended to send a message to the accused that 
they doubted his story. These views did not appear to influence other jurors – 
indeed two of the jurors expressing opposing views were on the same jury and 
                                         
108 Three statements to this effect were also made across three of the 32 two-verdict juries (all 
rape trial juries). 
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neither explicitly stated that they had changed their mind as a result of the other 
person’s opinion – but it cannot be ruled out that other jurors were influenced by 
these statements about stigma without expressly saying so.  
5.5 Reasons for choosing one acquittal verdict over the other 
Establishing exactly why jurors chose a particular verdict was often challenging. 
Jurors did not always give clear or illuminating reasons for favouring a particular 
verdict (either in their questionnaire or during deliberations), and those in three-
verdict juries almost never explained exactly why they had selected one acquittal 
verdict over the other. However, comparison of jurors’ stated reasons for choosing 
(a) not proven and (b) not guilty (drawing on both questionnaire data109 and jurors’ 
deliberations) suggests that there are some general differences in reasons for 
choosing the two acquittal verdicts. 
In summary, jurors choosing the not guilty verdict (where both acquittal verdicts 
were available) tended to justify this in one of two ways:  
• The first was that they believed the accused was innocent. This contrasts with 
jurors who chose the not proven verdict, who tended to justify this on the basis 
that guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt (sometimes 
accompanied by a belief that the accused was probably guilty, and sometimes 
by a belief that there was not enough evidence to form a view either way).  
• The second was that they believed one or more of the prosecution witnesses 
were lying. Again, this contrasts with those who favoured not proven, who 
tended to justify this on the basis that they found it difficult to decide between the 
truthfulness of the different witnesses’ accounts.  
A more detailed comparison of reasons for choosing not guilty and not proven in 
each trial shows that jurors who favoured not proven were:110 
• More likely to refer to the difficulty of choosing between the accounts given by 
the complainer and the accused (28% of rape trial jurors who thought the verdict 
should be not proven, compared to 12% of jurors who thought the verdict should 
be not guilty; the equivalent figures for the assault trial were 17% vs 6%). 
• For the assault trial only, significantly more likely to refer in general terms to 
whether there was enough evidence to convict, or to additional evidence they 
felt was needed (for example, 60% of assault trial jurors who thought the verdict 
should be not proven cited insufficient evidence to convict vs. 41% of assault 
trial jurors who thought the verdict should be not guilty).  
• For the rape trial only, significantly more likely to refer specifically to whether the 
case had been proved ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ (34% of rape trial jurors who 
                                         
109 See Tables J.11 and J.12, based on jurors’ explanations of their initial verdict preferences (prior 
to deliberating). Jurors were also asked in the post-deliberation questionnaire for their personal 
choice of verdict and the reasons for this. These reflected similar themes to the reasons given pre-
deliberation but, as so few jurors in the three-verdict condition selected a not guilty verdict at this 
stage, there were insufficient numbers for meaningful analysis. The data is based on an open-
ended question, with responses categorised by Ipsos MORI’s specialist coding team, using a code 
frame developed by the research team. 
110 Tables J.11 and J.12, Annex J. 
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thought the verdict should be not proven cited this vs. 19% of rape trial jurors 
who thought the verdict should be not guilty). 
• In the rape trial only, jurors who favoured not proven were less likely to refer to 
specific elements of the evidence, and tended instead towards more general 
statements, such as ‘not enough evidence to convict’ (42% of jurors who thought 
the verdict should be not proven referred to specific elements of the evidence, 
compared with 65% of jurors who thought the verdict should be not guilty). 
(See Annex J, Tables J.11 – J.13 for more detail). 
These findings are consistent with discussions during the deliberations, where – 
among those jurors who expressed a reason for their choice of verdict – there was 
clear variation in the kinds of reasons cited by those who chose not proven and 
those who chose not guilty. Stated reasons for favouring not proven often reflected 
jurors’ different understandings of not proven discussed above – for example, 
choosing it because they were not convinced of the accused’s innocence. Jurors 
also noted difficulty choosing between the accounts given by the accused and the 
complainer as a reason for choosing not proven (in both assault and rape trials): 
“Well, the thing is if you had two children and you had a falling out and you 
weren’t there, which of them would you believe? You know, if you had two kids 
and they had a disagreement about something would you say you're guilty, or 
would you say I'm not really sure and not proven? I would say, well I wasn't really 
there so I can't decide which of you, I'm not 100 per cent sure. That's why I would 
say as well not proven, because I wasn't actually there, I didn't see what 
happened.”  
(Assault trial / three-verdict / 12-person / unanimity) 
“I think it's very difficult with this because it's only one against one, there is no 
other witnesses. And I mean it's kind of a ... quite a hard thing to say which one 
is innocent or not, I'm finding it difficult. One minute we're looking at I was with 
him, and the next minute I was with her, and I'm finding it difficult … I would say 
not proven, because I'm not sure.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / unanimity)  
Other jurors linked their choice of a not proven verdict to the corroboration rule. As 
noted earlier (section 4.3.2), all juries were directed that the accused cannot be 
convicted on one source of evidence alone (in line with the way juries would be 
directed in a real Scottish criminal trial). This direction was picked up among jurors 
choosing a not proven verdict, particularly in the rape trial. For example: 
“Yes, I'm going not proven, because I think that [the complainer] is credible and 
reliable and I believe her testimony, but as the judge said, we need to have 
corroboration and I don't think it was beyond reasonable doubt corroboration.”  
(Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / unanimity) 
A final related theme, which again was most prominent in the rape trial, was jurors 
justifying their choice of not proven on the basis that they personally thought the 
 54 
accused was guilty but were not sure of this beyond reasonable doubt. For 
example: 
“I think he was guilty, but I would probably have to go for a not proven because I 
think the fact that they couldn't prove beyond whatever reasonable doubt that 
she got the bruises from an attack means that really reluctantly I would probably 
have to go not proven. Although on the basis of her testimony and his, I definitely 
believe her.” 
 (Rape trial / three-verdict / 15-person / simple majority) 
Again, this is consistent with the finding, discussed above (section 5.4.1), that 70% 
of all jurors believed not proven is the most appropriate verdict when jurors think 
the accused is guilty but that this has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.  
There was evidence of unease among some rape trial jurors about choosing the not 
proven verdict when they believed that the accused was probably guilty. For 
example, one juror who thought not proven was the correct verdict nonetheless 
spoke of the accused “walking away” if he was in fact guilty and found this “difficult”. 
Another, who also supported a not proven verdict on the basis that the case had 
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, nonetheless felt that this verdict was 
“unfair” to the complainer and could be seen as “saying that we’re sanctioning 
rape”.  
5.5.1 Reasons for switching between acquittal verdicts 
69 of the 431 jurors (16%) deliberating in three-verdict juries switched between the 
two acquittal verdicts over the course of deliberations.111 This switch was most 
commonly from not guilty to not proven (12% of three-verdict jurors switched in this 
direction, with 4% changing from not proven to not guilty).  
The scope for analysis of reasons for switching between acquittal verdicts is limited 
by the low numbers – of the 69 jurors who switched, only 48 gave a reason for 
doing so in their post-deliberation questionnaire.112 Moreover, the reasons given 
were not always particularly illuminating – the most common reason was simply 
that they had been persuaded by the discussion (67% of jurors who switched 
between acquittal verdicts and gave a reason for having done so). Other reasons 
for switching between acquittal verdicts generally reflected the themes already 
discussed: jurors’ views by the end of deliberation on whether there was enough 
evidence or proof in general (33%); the perceived reliability and credibility of the 
complainer (23%) and witness (19%); and difficulties in choosing between 
inconsistent accounts or evidence (17%). 
There were only five examples of jurors giving an explicit account during 
deliberations of their reasons for switching between the two acquittal verdicts. 
Again, their explanations reflected jurors’ reasons for favouring not proven or not 
                                         
111 This figure is based on comparison of the verdicts they favoured in their pre- and post-
deliberation questionnaires. 
112 This reflects the fact that a small number of jurors appeared to have changed verdicts based on 
the verdicts they recorded on their pre- and post-deliberation questionnaire, but appeared not to 
recall having done so when asked directly about this. 
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guilty, discussed above – for example, becoming convinced of the accused’s 
innocence (as a reason for switching from not proven to not guilty), or difficulties 
choosing between the accounts of the accused and the complainer (as a reason for 
switching in the opposite direction). 
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6 Conclusions 
This final chapter summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from this study 
with respect to the two key research questions: 
• What effects do the unique features of the Scottish jury system 
(majority, size and the three-verdict system) have on jury reasoning and 
jury decision-making?  
• What are jurors’ understandings of the not proven verdict and why 
might they choose this verdict over another verdict? 
Each of the three unique features of the Scottish jury system – 15 members, simple 
majority verdicts, and the availability of the not proven verdict – is discussed in turn, 
along with the potential implications of any changes to those features. 
6.1 What effects do the unique features of the Scottish jury 
system have on jury reasoning and jury decision-making? 
6.1.1 What impact do the unique features have on verdict choice?  
At jury level, there were no statistically significant differences in the proportion of 
guilty versus acquittal verdicts returned between juries that had the not proven 
verdict available and juries that did not, between 12 and 15-person juries, or 
between juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict and those asked to reach a 
simple majority. This is unsurprising given the sample size. 
There were, however, a number of statistically significant differences in verdict 
preferences of individual jurors, namely that:  
• When the not proven verdict was available, more individual jurors 
favoured acquittal. This difference was apparent both before and after 
deliberation – in other words, the availability of not proven was associated 
with individual jurors being less likely to favour a guilty verdict, independently 
of any impact of deliberating as a group. 
• Jurors in 15-person juries were less likely to change their minds on  
the verdict than jurors in 12-person juries. Although jurors in 15-person 
juries were more likely to think the verdict should be guilty (after deliberating) 
than were jurors in 12-person juries, this does not necessarily indicate that 
15-person juries would be more likely to return guilty verdicts across a larger 
number of differently balanced trials. Rather, it is a reflection of the related 
finding that jurors in 15-person juries were less likely to change their initial 
view on the verdict than jurors in 12-person juries. The reason for this may 
simply be one of jury dynamics – in a 15-person jury, on average more 
people would need to shift their position to change the outcome. There may, 
therefore, be less motivation for ‘minority’ jurors in a 15-person jury (which in 
this case was usually those who favoured guilty) to shift that position to bring 
deliberations to a close. 
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• Whilst jurors who were asked to reach a simple majority were more 
likely to think the verdict should be guilty (after deliberating) than those 
who were asked to reach a unanimous verdict, this does not 
necessarily imply that requiring unanimity would result in fewer guilty 
verdicts. It might simply reflect a greater tendency among jurors who 
favour a minority verdict at the outset to move towards the majority 
position during deliberations. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that jurors may be less willing to move from acquittal to guilty when the 
initial balance of opinion is the other way around – five of the six 
unanimity juries that started out with a majority for guilty ended up hanging, 
compared with one of the 25 unanimity juries that started with a majority for 
acquittal. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that: 
• Reducing jury size from 15 to 12 might, in some trials, lead to more 
individual jurors switching their position to facilitate a verdict.  
• Moving from requiring juries to reach a simple majority to requiring 
unanimity or near unanimity might tilt more jurors in favour of acquittal – and 
might, therefore, lead to more acquittals over a larger number of trials.  
• Removing the not proven verdict might incline more jurors towards a guilty 
verdict – and might, therefore, lead to more guilty verdicts over a larger 
number of trials. 
It is not possible, based on these findings, to estimate the likely scale of any impact 
on the verdicts juries reach arising from changing these features, since the precise 
effect will depend on other factors including the balance of evidence and the initial 
balance of opinion in the jury in each trial. However, analysis of interactions 
between the different features suggests that the feature that makes the most 
difference to individual juror views on the verdict is the majority required. Moreover, 
this is the only difference that was statistically significant across both the rape and 
the assault trial juries – jury size and the number of verdicts available were 
significantly associated with individual verdict preferences in the assault trial only. 
The combination of features most likely to tilt jurors towards acquittal appears to be 
12-person, three-verdict, and unanimity required, while the combination most 
strongly associated with jurors favouring a guilty verdict is 15-person, two-verdict, 
simple majority. Neither of these is the system currently employed in either 
Scotland or most other English language jurisdictions. However, the latter would be 
the system in Scotland if the not proven verdict were removed with no other 
changes being made. 
6.1.2 What impact do the unique features have on how juries reach 
decisions? 
15-person juries were associated with somewhat lower levels of juror participation 
than 12-person juries across a number of measures. For example: 
• Jurors were more likely to be observed wanting to contribute, but being 
unable to do so in 15-person juries. 
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• There were more dominant jurors and more minimally contributing jurors, on 
average, in 15-person juries. 
• Jurors in 15-person juries were more likely to agree that “some members of 
the jury talked too much”. 
• Jurors in 15-person juries gave lower ratings of their own influence over the 
verdict. 
• When reviewing 15-person juries, it was common for researchers to note the 
existence of side conversations running concurrently within discussions, and 
for them to comment on the existence of higher levels of interruption and 
speaking over one another, which was perceived to lead to a less ordered 
deliberation overall. 
However, the higher level of juror participation in 12-person juries was not 
associated with longer deliberations (there was no difference in deliberation length 
by jury size) or with any increase in the number of evidential issues discussed or 
with the extent or accuracy of discussion of legal issues. 
In contrast, the majority required did make a significant difference to how long juries 
deliberated: juries asked to reach a unanimous verdict took substantially longer 
over deliberations than did those required to reach a simple majority. In terms of 
juror participation, there were no significant differences in observed levels of juror 
participation by majority required. However, there were some differences in jurors’ 
own perceptions of their involvement, all of which indicated that those who had 
been asked to reach a unanimous verdict were a little more likely to feel they had 
been fully involved and had influenced the decision. Requiring juries to reach 
unanimity may thus provide more opportunity for everyone to feel that they have 
been able to put their views across before a verdict is reached. This does not seem 
to be associated with any increase in the range of evidential issues discussed or 
the extent or accuracy of discussion of legal issues, however. 
The presence or absence of the not proven verdict appeared to have little impact 
on the key aspects of the decision-making process examined in this research. 
There were no differences in: the length of time taken to reach a verdict; the mean 
number of evidential issues raised; the extent or accuracy of the discussion of legal 
issues (other than discussion of the not proven verdict itself); or levels of juror 
participation across various measures. However, jurors asked to choose between 
two verdicts were slightly more likely to say they had been dissatisfied with the 
experience than jurors who had three verdicts available. This suggests that there 
might be a small increase in juror dissatisfaction if not proven were not available.  
Taken together these findings suggest that: 
• Reducing jury size from 15 to 12 might lead to more jurors participating 
more fully in the deliberations and is unlikely to have much impact on 
deliberation length or the range of evidential or legal issues discussed. 
• Moving from requiring juries to reach a simple majority to requiring 
unanimity or near unanimity would be likely to increase the average 
deliberation time (although we cannot say by how much, as the maximum 
deliberation time was limited to 90 minutes for the purposes of this research), 
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and may result in jurors being more likely to feel they have had the 
opportunity to put their views across before a verdict is reached. However, 
this may not lead to any improvement in the range of evidential or legal 
issues actually discussed. 
• Removing the not proven verdict is unlikely to have much impact on key 
aspects of the jury decision-making process, such as deliberation length or 
juror participation, but may be associated with a slight increase in juror 
dissatisfaction.  
6.2 How do jurors understand the not proven verdict? 
Across the 32 mock juries that had not proven as a verdict option, the meaning and 
consequences of the not proven verdict were rarely discussed at any length during 
deliberations, even in juries where that verdict was returned. Where the not proven 
verdict was discussed, however, there was evidence of jurors holding inconsistent 
understandings of what the verdict meant along with some confusion over its effect. 
In particular, jurors expressed uncertainty as to how it differed (if at all) from a not 
guilty verdict.  
Although not proven and not guilty have the same effect in law, jurors tended to 
give different reasons for choosing them. Those who favoured the not proven 
verdict tended to base this on a belief that the evidence did not prove guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt, or on the difficulty of choosing between two competing accounts. 
Jurors choosing the not guilty verdict (where not proven was also an option), on the 
other hand, tended to attribute this to a belief that the accused was innocent or to 
some aspect of the complainer’s or witness’ evidence that suggested that they were 
not giving a truthful account. 
The idea that the not proven verdict should be used when jurors think that the 
accused is probably guilty but that this has not been proven to the necessary 
standard arose frequently, albeit briefly, in deliberations. It was also the issue on 
which there was the clearest agreement in questionnaire responses. Jurors also 
expressed the (related) view that there would be a lingering stigma attached to 
receiving a verdict of not proven. 
6.3 Other implications: supporting juror understanding 
As discussed above, there is no evidence from this study that changing one or 
more of the unique features of the Scottish jury system would have an impact on 
the number of evidential issues or on the extent or accuracy of legal issues 
discussed during deliberations.  
However, the findings do raise important questions about what can be done to 
support juror understanding of legal issues, including their understanding of the 
meaning and effects of the not proven verdict. Several potential misunderstandings 
on the part of individual jurors (e.g. a belief that the accused should prove their 
innocence, or a belief that the accused can be retried following a not proven verdict 
but not a not guilty verdict) arose relatively frequently across the mock juries. This 
suggests that there may be a need to consider whether jurors require additional 
guidance (such as written routes to verdict or written reminders of key legal 
principles) to aid their discussion. A more detailed consideration of this issue can 
 60 
be found in another strand of this research, which involved an extensive evidence 
review of ways in which juror communication methods might be improved: see J 
Chalmers and F Leverick, Methods of Conveying Information to Jurors: An 
Evidence Review (2018).  
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Annex A – Full research questions 
1. What are jurors’ understandings of the not proven verdict and why might they 
choose one over another verdict? 
a. What are mock jurors’ understanding(s) of the difference between not proven 
and not guilty verdicts and their consequences (e.g. retrial)? 
b. What reasons do mock jurors give for why they might choose one verdict over 
the other? 
2. What effects do the unique features of the Scottish jury system (majority, size 
and the three verdict system) have on jury reasoning and jury decision-making? 
a. Are there any differences in mock jury verdicts between a two verdict system and 
a three verdict system? What might explain those differences? (e.g. use and/or 
understanding of not proven verdict, consideration of evidence, length of 
deliberation, etc.). 
b. Where individual mock jurors alter their verdict (between not proven and not 
guilty) as a result of jury deliberations what reasons do they give for doing so? 
c. How does jury size (15 person jury compared to a 12 person jury) affect levels of 
participation of members of a mock jury? 
d. Are there any differences in mock jury verdicts between a 12 and 15 person jury? 
What might explain those differences? 
e. Are there any differences in mock jury verdicts between a simple majority for 
guilty and unanimity or a qualified majority for any verdict? 
f. What are the differences (if any) in jury reasoning and decision-making, between 
requiring a jury to reach unanimity or a qualified majority for any verdict and 
requiring a jury to reach a guilty verdict by a simple majority? Are there any 
indications as to how these differences might explain any observed variation in 
mock jury verdicts between the two verdict systems? 
g. Does a unanimous verdict or qualified majority confer any advantages over a 
simple majority verdict? (e.g. whether unanimity encourages a fuller debate of the 
issues arising and/or the jury to act as a unit). 
h. What effect, if any, does jury size have on jury reasoning and decision-making 
(including jury verdict) in a system of unanimity or qualified majority with 2 verdicts? 
(E.g. does a jury of 15 find it more difficult to reach a unanimous verdict than a jury 
of 12?). 
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i. Are there any differences in mock jury verdicts between a 12 person jury with only 
2 possible verdicts (English and Welsh model) and a 15 person jury with 3 verdicts 
(Scottish model)? Drawing on the results of this simulation and other case 
simulations, what might explain those differences? 
j. Overall, what do the findings of the mock jury research tell us about how the 
various independent variables (number of verdicts, simple majority verdict vs. 
unanimity/qualified majority verdict and jury size) interact with each other? 
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Annex B – Assessing mock jury research 
The majority of empirical exploration of jury decision-making has been conducted 
using mock jury studies.113 This is, in part, a result of legal restrictions which limit 
the scope for researchers to interview actual jurors about their experience of real 
criminal trials.114 Mock jury studies simulate the experience of sitting on a jury by 
asking participants to read, listen to, or watch trial materials and then return a 
verdict. The trial materials used are generally fictional and significantly abbreviated 
in comparison with a real criminal trial.  
Mock jury studies vary greatly in the extent to which their findings are generalisable 
– that is, in how far their findings are likely to apply to real juries, deliberating in 
actual criminal trials.115 It is therefore important to understand the research 
methods used by any mock jury study before assessing how much weight to put on 
its findings. Four questions in particular need to be considered:116 
• How representative was the sample of mock jurors? Academic mock jury 
studies sometimes use a convenience sample of students (who often participate 
in exchange for course credit). This inevitably means that the profile of their 
‘mock jurors’ is quite different to that of real jurors in terms of characteristics like 
age and education. Researchers have debated how much this matters in terms 
of the wider generalisability of the findings. A meta-analysis has suggested that 
it makes little difference,117 although others have disagreed.118  
• How realistic were the trial stimulus materials? To create as realistic an 
experience as possible, many mock jury studies show participants an audio-
visual enactment of a trial (either a video or a live re-enactment). However, other 
studies have used written trial transcripts or study packs instead. This approach 
is clearly less realistic in terms of recreating the experience of attending a 
criminal trial. Even where jurors are shown a video or live re-enactment of a trial, 
it is important to assess how closely this reflects the reality of a criminal trial (for 
example, in terms of the accuracy of any legal instructions provided). 
• Did mock jurors deliberate? Real juries are required to deliberate as a group 
before returning a collective verdict. However, some mock jury studies do not 
include this element – they simply ask individual mock jurors what they think the 
verdict should be after they have read, listened to, or watched the trial materials. 
Studies that do not include an element of group deliberation are self-evidently 
                                         
113 Although these are not the only methods that have been used. For a more detailed discussion, 
see J Chalmers and F Leverick, Methods of Conveying Information to Jurors: An Evidence Review 
(2018) Annex 1. 
114 In Scotland, see Contempt of Court Act 1981 s 8. 
115 Researchers refer to this as the ‘external validity’ of the study. 
116 The steps we took in the present research to address these issues are outlined in chapter 2. 
117 BH Bornstein and others, “Mock juror sampling issues in jury simulation research: a meta-
analysis” (2017) 41 Law and Human Behavior 13 at 25. 
118 RL Wiener, DA Krauss and JD Lieberman, “Mock jury research: where do we go from here?” 
(2011) 29 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 467 at 472. 
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less realistic.119 Even in studies where deliberation is included, the time allowed 
for this is sometimes very short. The size of mock juries can also be much 
smaller than they would be in both Scotland and in most other English language 
jurisdictions – groups of six to eight are common.  
• How seriously did mock jurors engage with their ‘role’? Mock jurors are 
obviously aware that they are role-playing and that, as such, their decisions will 
not have ‘real’ consequences. That said, there is evidence from some studies 
that mock jurors engage very conscientiously with their role and express stress 
regarding their verdict choices.120 To increase the likelihood of mock jurors 
taking their task seriously, it is important that studies take as many steps as 
possible to maximise the solemnity of proceedings, such as using appropriate 
venues and directing mock jurors about their role in a similar way to real jurors. 
 
  
                                         
119 F Leverick, “Jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence: a re-evaluation” (2016) 49 
Creighton Law Review 555 at 566-567.  
120 E Finch and V Munro, “Lifting the veil: the use of focus groups and trial simulations in legal 
research” (2008) 35 Journal of Law and Society 30 at 45; L Ellison and V Munro, “Getting to (not) 
guilty: examining jurors’ deliberative processes in, and beyond, the context of a mock rape trial” 
(2010) 30 Legal Studies 74 at 84; P Ellsworth, “Are twelve heads better than one?” (1989) 52 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 205 at 223. 
 65 
Annex C – Previous research on not proven 
Smithson and others (2007) 
Smithson and others’ study involved 104 mock jurors reading two trial scenarios – 
one criminal (murder) and one civil – alongside judicial instructions.121 Having done 
so, they were asked to return individual verdicts (rather than deliberating in jury 
groups).122 Half of the jurors were initially restricted to returning verdicts of guilty or 
not guilty, whilst the remainder had the further option of not proven. After 
completing initial questionnaires, jurors were asked to render their verdict again, but 
with the alternative set of options to that with which they were initially presented. 
Having analysed responses across the two conditions, the researchers concluded 
that “[c]ontrary to the hypothesis that the not proven verdict lures people away from 
convictions, we find in both trials that it lures them away from full acquittals to a 
greater extent”.123 The reference here to ‘full acquittals’ is a reference to a not guilty 
verdict. As both not guilty and not proven verdicts are full acquittals in the Scottish 
system, movement from a guilty verdict to a not proven one might be regarded as 
rather more significant than movement from a not guilty verdict to a not proven one. 
In any event, the realism of the methods used in this study is particularly low and 
thus the reliance that can be placed on its findings is accordingly very limited. 
Hope and others (2008) 
A further exploration of the impact of a three-verdict system was undertaken by 
Hope and others, across two different studies.124 In the first study, 104 mock jurors 
were provided with a written summary of a sexual assault trial and jury directions. 
The mock jurors (who again returned verdicts individually rather than deliberating in 
groups) were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: a two-
verdict condition where they returned a verdict of either guilty or not guilty; and a 
three-verdict condition where they also had the option of a not proven verdict. The 
difference in acquittal rates was not statistically significant. 
In the second study, Hope and others recruited participants to 28 juries (4 to 8 
members). Jurors were provided with a written summary of a (non-sexual) assault 
trial and jury directions. There were three different versions of the trial, with the 
strength of the prosecution evidence varying (strong, moderate or weak). Half of the 
juries were restricted to returning a verdict of either guilty or not guilty whilst the rest 
also had the option of a not proven verdict. The juries were asked to reach a 
unanimous verdict if possible, and to record the verdict of the majority if not. Here, 
the research found that the proportion of jurors favouring conviction was higher 
                                         
121 M Smithson, S Deady and L Gracik, “Guilty, not guilty, or…? Multiple options in jury verdict 
choices” (2007) 20 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 481.  
122 A civil jury would not in fact be asked to return a verdict in the forms “guilty”, “not guilty” or “not 
proven”. The judicial instructions did, however, instruct the jurors to apply a “balance of 
probabilities” standard in the civil case. 
123 M Smithson, S Deady and L Gracik, “Guilty, not guilty, or…? Multiple options in jury verdict 
choices” (2007) 20 Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 481 at 486. 
124 Both reported in L Hope and others, “A third verdict option: exploring the impact of the not 
proven verdict on mock juror decision making” (2008) 32 Law and Human Behaviour 241.  
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where only two verdicts were available (35% rather than 22%, marginally 
statistically significant), but there was an association between the number of 
available verdicts and the outcomes (at juror level) only in respect of the “moderate” 
version of the evidential case. 
Curley and others (2019) 
Most recently, Curley and others have revisted the effect of the not proven 
verdict.125 In this study, 128 mock jurors (primarily student volunteers) listened to 
two audio vignettes of around six minutes long and were asked to return individual 
verdicts. Half of participants had the option of returning a not proven, not guilty or 
guilty verdict when listening to the first vignette, but were restricted to either not 
guilty or guilty when listening to the second. Meanwhile, the remainder had two 
verdicts available in the first vignette and three in the second. The difference in 
conviction rates was not statistically significant. Though it used audio vignettes 
rather than written summaries, the study shares the limited realism of its 
predecessors, and – aside from broader concerns about external validity – the fact 
that participants gave their verdicts under both the two and three-verdict conditions 
in quick succession may also have affected their verdict choices. 
 
  
                                         
125 LJ Curley and others, “The bastard verdict and its influence on jurors”, (2019) 59 Medicine, 
Science and the Law 26. 
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Annex D – Summaries of content of trial 
videos 
Assault trial synopsis 
The complainer (C) and accused (A) had both been drinking in a bar in which they 
were both regulars. They knew each other by sight. On the night in question, both 
had been drinking for several hours. The accused attended the bar with three 
friends. The complainer was with his partner (W). The accused left the bar to 
smoke outside. There was no-one else present. The complainer left the bar to go 
home with his partner, but she stopped to speak to a work colleague, meaning that 
he exited before her. Once outside, he collided with the accused, spilling the 
accused’s drink. What happened afterwards is unclear. The complainer’s account 
(and the prosecution case) is that the accused took a knife from his pocket, lunged 
at the complainer and stabbed him in his left shoulder. The accused’s case is that it 
was the complainer who produced the knife, which he managed to grab from the 
complainer during the course of a stuggle and which he then used on the 
complainer in self-defence. The complainer’s partner testified that she saw the 
accused push the complainer to the ground, but on cross-examination admitted that 
she could not have seen this as she had not left the bar at that point. She was 
adamant, however, that she saw the accused produce the knife. It was agreed in 
evidence that both sets of fingerprints were found on the knife, which the 
complainer explained by testifying that he had picked up the knife after the accused 
fled the scene. It was also agreed that the complainer sustained a knife wound to 
his left shoulder that required surgery, leaving a permanent scar of 10cm in length 
and permanently impairing the movement of his arm. 
Sections of Video: Judicial Introduction to Jury; Prosecution Evidence (examination-
in-chief of C; cross-examination of C by defence; and re-examination of C; 
plus examination-in-chief of W and cross-examination of W by defence); Defence 
Evidence (examination-in-chief of A; cross-examination of A by prosecution; and re-
examination of A); Closing Speeches by Prosecution and Defence; Judicial 
Summing Up and Instructions to the Jury. 
Rape trial synopsis 
The complainer (C) and accused (A) had been in an eight-month relationship, 
which ended approximately two months before the alleged offence took place. The 
accused called at the complainer’s home (which they previously shared) to collect 
some possessions. He and the complainer each drank a glass of wine and some 
coffee as they chatted. A few hours later, as the accused made to leave, the two 
kissed. It was the prosecution's case that the accused then tried to initiate sexual 
intercourse with the complainer, touching her on the breast and thigh, and that the 
complainer made it clear that she did not consent to this by telling the accused to 
stop and pushing away his hands. The prosecution alleged that the accused 
ignored these protestations and went on to rape the complainer. When the accused 
was questioned by the police, he admitted that he had had sexual intercourse with 
the complainer, but maintained that all contact was consensual, and this was the 
approach taken by the defence. A forensic examiner (W) testified that the 
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complainer had suffered bruising to her inner thighs and chest and scratches to her 
breasts that were consistent with the application of considerable force, but that – as 
was not uncommon in cases of rape – she had sustained no internal bruising. The 
forensic examiner advised that the evidence available following her examination of 
the complainer was consistent with rape, but that she could not rule out alternative 
explanations for the injuries.  
Sections of Video: Judicial Introduction to Jury; Prosecution Evidence (examination-
in-chief of C; cross-examination of C by defence; and re-examination of C; plus 
examination-in-chief of W; cross-examination of W by defence); Defence Evidence 
(examination-in-chief of D; cross-examination of D by prosecution; and re-
examination of D); Closing Speeches by Prosecution and Defence; Judicial 
Summing Up and Instructions to the Jury. 
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Annex E – Questionnaires 
The questionnaires shown here are ‘Version A’, which was given to all 2-verdict 
juries (those who could choose either a guilty or not guilty verdict). An adapted 
version (version B) was given to 3-verdict juries (those who could return a guilty, 
not guilty or not proven verdict). However, as the wording is almost identical (other 
than the addition of an extra verdict option at relevant questions), we have not 
included this in the report. Similarly, we have also included ‘Version C’, which was 
given to ‘spare’ jurors (who did not go on to deliberate) in 2-verdict juries. An 
equivalent ‘Version D’ (not shown here) was given to ‘spare’ jurors in 3-verdict 
juries. 
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SCOTTISH JURIES RESEARCH 
PRE-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE Version A 
 
 
DATE OF JURY: 
 
JURY REFERENCE LETTER:  
 
JUROR ID NUMBER: 
   
 
SERIAL NUMBER:  
 
 
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WITHOUT DISCUSSING YOUR 
RESPONSES WITH ANYONE ELSE, AND HAND IT TO THE RESEARCHER 
WHEN COMPLETE. 
 
 
 
 
HOW TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
• Please read each question carefully. 
 
• Answer ALL 4 QUESTIONS. 
 
• Two questions ask you to tick the box   ✓   which comes closest to your views. 
Two questions ask you to write your answer in a box. Please try to write as 
clearly as possible. 
 
• If you have any questions, please ask the researcher. 
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Q1 Based on the evidence you have just seen, what do you think the verdict 
should be? If you are not sure, please say which verdict you would choose if 
you had to pick one now. 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Guilty 
  Not guilty 
 
 
Q2 Please could you briefly explain why you would choose that verdict?  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
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Q3 How confident are you that your verdict is the right one?  
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
   
  Very confident 
  Fairly confident 
  Not very confident 
  Not at all confident 
   
   
 
 
Q4 Why do you feel that way? Please briefly explain your level of confidence in 
your verdict.  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE CHECK THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL FOUR QUESTIONS THEN 
HAND THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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SCOTTISH JURIES RESEARCH 
 
POST-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE Version A 
 
 
DATE OF JURY: 
 
JURY REFERENCE LETTER:  
 
JUROR ID NUMBER: 
   
 
SERIAL NUMBER:  
 
 
 
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WITHOUT DISCUSSING YOUR 
RESPONSES WITH ANYONE ELSE, AND HAND IT TO THE RESEARCHER 
WHEN COMPLETE. 
 
 
 
 
HOW TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
• Please read each question carefully. 
 
• Answer ALL QUESTIONS unless instructed otherwise.  
 
• Most questions ask you to tick the box   ✓   which comes closest to your 
views. A few questions ask you to write your answer in a box. Please try to 
write as clearly as possible. 
 
• Some questions are presented in a ‘grid’. For these questions, please tick one 
answer ON EACH ROW. 
 
• If you have any questions, please ask the researcher. 
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Section 1: Your view on the right verdict 
  
Q1 By the end of your jury discussion, what did you personally think the verdict 
should be? If you were not sure, please say which verdict you would have 
chosen if you had to pick one. 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Guilty 
  Not guilty 
   
 
Q2 Please could you briefly explain why you thought that was the right verdict?  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
 
  
 
 
Q3 Before you discussed the trial with the other jury members, you filled in a 
questionnaire that asked what you thought the verdict should be.  
 
Do you still agree with the verdict you chose on that first questionnaire, or 
had you changed your mind by the end of the discussion? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Yes, still agree with the verdict I chose on first questionnaire              GO 
TO Q5 
  No, changed my mind by the end of the discussion                                   
GO TO Q4 
   Can’t remember what verdict I chose on the first questionnaire                 
GO TO Q5 
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Q4 Why did you change your mind?  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
 
  
 
 
Section 2: The verdict your jury reached as a group 
 
 
 
 
Q5 Now, we are going to ask about the verdict reached by your jury as a group. 
In the end, was your jury able to reach a verdict? (This might have been a 
verdict that most, but not all, of you agreed on). 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Yes  GO TO Q6 
  No  GO TO Q8 
   
 
 
IF YOU CHANGED YOUR MIND ABOUT THE VERDICT, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTION 4 (IF 
YOU DID NOT CHANGE YOUR MIND, SKIP TO Q5) 
ANSWER Q6 IF YOU SAID YES AT Q5, YOUR JURY DID REACH A VERDICT IN THE END. 
 
IF YOUR JURY WAS NOT ABLE TO REACH A VERDICT, PLEASE SKIP TO Q8 
 
EVERYONE SHOULD ANSWER Q5 
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Q6a What verdict did your jury reach as a group? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Guilty 
  Not guilty 
   
Q6b Please write in the reasons you think your jury had for reaching that verdict.  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
 
  
 
 
Q7 How confident are you that the verdict your jury reached is the right one?  
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Very confident 
  Fairly confident 
  Not very confident 
  Not at all confident 
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Q8 Thinking about your experience of discussing the trial with other jury members, 
how much would you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
ON EACH ROW, PLEASE TICK ü ONE BOX 
Strongly 
agree Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Not 
sure 
a) I felt comfortable saying what
I thought in front of other jury
members o o o o o o 
b) I felt that some members of the jury
talked too much o o o o o o 
c) I felt I was able to say as much as
I wanted…………………………… o o o o o o 
d) I often stayed silent when I had
things I wanted to
say………………………………… o o o o o o 
e) I felt fully involved in the decision
that the jury
reached…………………………… o o o o o o 
f) I felt I was a useful member of the
jury o o o o o o 
EVERYONE SHOULD ANSWER Q8 
 78 
 
Q9 If you felt that you were not able to take part in the discussion with other 
jury members as much as you would have liked, please say briefly why 
you felt this was the case.  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
 
  
 
 
Q10 On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is ‘No influence’ and 7 is ‘A great deal of 
influence’, how much influence do you feel that you, personally, had on the 
verdict of the jury? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  1 (No influence) 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 (A great deal of influence) 
  Don’t know 
  
EVERYONE SHOULD ANSWER ALL OF THE REMAINING QUESTIONS IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Q11 Overall, how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with the experience of being 
a juror today? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Very satisfied 
  Fairly satisfied 
  Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
  Fairly dissatisfied 
  Very dissatisfied 
  Don’t know 
 
 
 
Q12 In a real Scottish Criminal Court, juries are asked to choose between 3 
verdicts – guilty, not guilty and not proven.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is ‘I do not understand the not proven verdict at 
all’ and 7 is ‘I fully understand the not proven verdict’, how would you rate 
your understanding of the not proven verdict? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  1 (I do not understand the not proven verdict at all) 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 (I fully understand the not proven verdict) 
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Q13 Please say whether you think each of these statements is definitely true, 
probably true, probably not true, or definitely not true. 
ON EACH ROW, PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX  
 
 
 
Definitely 
true 
Probably 
true 
Probably 
not true 
Definitely 
not true 
Don’t 
know 
a) A not proven verdict means that the 
accused can be tried again for the same 
crime       
b) If the verdict is not proven, the accused 
still gets a criminal record       
c) A not proven verdict should be used when 
the jurors need to compromise to decide 
on a verdict …………………      
 
 
Q14 And please say whether you think each of these statements is definitely true, 
probably true, probably not true, or definitely not true. 
ON EACH ROW, PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX  
 
 
 
Definitely 
true 
Probably 
true 
Probably 
not true 
Definitely 
not true 
Don’t 
know 
a) A not guilty verdict means that the accused 
can be tried again for the same crime       
b) If the verdict is not guilty, the accused still 
gets a criminal record       
c) A not guilty verdict should be used when 
the jurors need to compromise to decide 
on a verdict …………………      
 
 
Q15 What should a jury do if they think the accused is guilty, but do not think the 
evidence proves it beyond reasonable doubt? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  They should return a verdict of guilty 
  They should return a verdict of not guilty 
  They should return a verdict of not proven  
  They should return either a verdict of not guilty or not proven – it does 
not matter which of these two verdicts they choose 
  Don’t know 
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Section 3: About you 
  
Finally, a few questions about you. 
 
Q16 How would you describe your gender identity? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  Man 
  Woman 
  In another way (if you would like to, please tell us what other words you 
use to describe your gender identity) (PLEASE TICK ✓ THE BOX AND 
WRITE IN BELOW) 
  
 
 
Q17 What is your age? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  18-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55-64 
  65+ 
  Prefer not to say 
 
 
Q18 Which of the following best describes your employment status? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  Employed full time  
  Employed part time 
  In full-time education 
  Retired 
  Looking after the home / full time carer 
  Unable to work due to disability 
  Unemployed  
  Prefer not to say 
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Q19 Which of the following is the highest educational or professional 
qualification you have obtained? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  No formal qualifications 
  SVQ 1-2 or equivalent 
  Standard grade, ‘O’ grade, GCSE or equivalent 
  Higher grade, A-levels, SVQ level 3 or equivalent 
  HND, HNC, RSA Higher diploma, SVQ level 4 or equivalent 
  Degree, PhD, SVQ level 5 or equivalent 
 
 
Other qualification (PLEASE TICK ✓ THE BOX AND WRITE IN 
BELOW) 
   
  Unsure 
  Prefer not to say 
   
   
 
 
PLEASE TAKE A MINUTE TO CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE 
QUESTIONS THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE ANSWERED THEN HAND THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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SCOTTISH JURIES RESEARCH 
 
PRE-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE Version C 
 
 
DATE OF JURY: 
 
JURY REFERENCE LETTER:  
 
JUROR ID NUMBER: 
   
 
SERIAL NUMBER:  
 
 
 
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS QUESTIONNAIRE WITHOUT DISCUSSING YOUR 
RESPONSES WITH ANYONE ELSE, AND HAND IT TO THE RESEARCHER 
WHEN COMPLETE. 
 
 
 
 
HOW TO COMPLETE THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
• Please read each question carefully. 
 
• Answer ALL QUESTIONS unless instructed otherwise.  
 
• Most questions ask you to tick the box   ✓   which comes closest to your 
views. A few questions ask you to write your answer in a box. Please try to 
write as clearly as possible. 
 
• Some questions are presented in a ‘grid’. For these questions, please tick one 
answer ON EACH ROW. 
 
• If you have any questions, please ask the researcher. 
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Section 1: Your view on the right verdict 
  
Q1 Based on the evidence you have just seen, what do you think the verdict 
should be? If you are not sure, please say which verdict you would choose 
if you had to pick one now. 
 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  Guilty 
  Not guilty 
   
 
Q2 Please could you briefly explain why you would choose that verdict?  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
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Q3 How confident are you that your verdict is the right one?  
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
   
  Very confident 
  Fairly confident 
  Not very confident 
  Not at all confident 
   
 
Q4 Why do you feel that way? Please briefly explain your level of confidence in 
your verdict.  
PLEASE WRITE IN BELOW 
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Q5 In a real Scottish Criminal Court, juries are asked to choose between 3 
verdicts – guilty, not guilty and not proven.  
 
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is ‘I do not understand the not proven verdict 
at all’ and 7 is ‘I fully understand the not proven verdict’, how would you rate 
your understanding of the not proven verdict? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  1 (I do not understand the not proven verdict at all) 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
  7 (I fully understand the not proven verdict) 
 
Q6 Please say whether you think each of these statements is definitely true, 
probably true, probably not true, or definitely not true. 
ON EACH ROW, PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX  
 
 
 
Definitely 
true 
Probably 
true 
Probably 
not true 
Definitely 
not true 
Don’t 
know 
a) A not proven verdict means that the 
accused can be tried again for the same 
crime       
b) If the verdict is not proven, the accused 
still gets a criminal record       
c) A not proven verdict should be used 
when the jurors need to compromise to 
decide on a verdict …………………      
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Q7 And please say whether you think each of these statements is definitely 
true, probably true, probably not true, or definitely not true. 
ON EACH ROW, PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX  
 
 
 
Definitely 
true 
Probably 
true 
Probably 
not true 
Definitely 
not true 
Don’t 
know 
a) A not guilty verdict means that the 
accused can be tried again for the 
same crime       
b) If the verdict is not guilty, the accused 
still gets a criminal record
       
c) A not guilty verdict should be used 
when the jurors need to compromise to 
decide on a verdict …………………      
 
 
Q8 What should a jury do if they think the accused is guilty, but do not think the 
evidence proves it beyond reasonable doubt? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
 
  They should return a verdict of guilty 
  They should return a verdict of not guilty 
  They should return a verdict of not proven  
  They should return either a verdict of not guilty or not proven – it does 
not matter which of these two verdicts they choose 
  Don’t know 
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Section 2: About you 
  
Finally, a few questions about you. 
 
Q9 How would you describe your gender identity? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  Man 
  Woman 
  In another way (if you would like to, please tell us what other words you 
use to describe your gender identity) (PLEASE TICK ✓ THE BOX AND 
WRITE IN BELOW) 
  
 
 
Q10 What is your age? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  18-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55-64 
  65+ 
  Prefer not to say 
 
 
Q11 Which of the following best describes your employment status? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  Employed full time  
  Employed part time 
  In full-time education 
  Retired 
  Looking after the home / full time carer 
  Unable to work due to disability 
  Unemployed  
  Prefer not to say 
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Q12 Which of the following is the highest educational or professional 
qualification you have obtained? 
PLEASE TICK ✓ ONE BOX ONLY 
 
  No formal qualifications 
  SVQ 1-2 or equivalent 
  Standard grade, ‘O’ grade, GCSE or equivalent 
  Higher grade, A-levels, SVQ level 3 or equivalent 
  HND, HNC, RSA Higher diploma, SVQ level 4 or equivalent 
  Degree, PhD, SVQ level 5 or equivalent 
 
 
Other qualification (PLEASE TICK ✓ THE BOX AND WRITE IN 
BELOW) 
   
  Unsure 
  Prefer not to say 
   
   
 
 
PLEASE TAKE A MINUTE TO CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE 
QUESTIONS THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE ANSWERED THEN HAND THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE TO THE RESEARCHER. 
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Annex F – Jury record sheet 
 
SCOTTISH JURIES RESEARCH 
 
JURY RECORD SHEET 
 
 
DATE OF JURY:         a.m / 
p.m (circle) 
 
JURY REFERENCE LETTER:  
 
RESEARCHER COMPLETING THIS FORM: 
 
TRIAL TYPE: 
  Assault 
  Rape 
 
NUMBER OF VERDICTS: 
  2  
  3  
 
VERDICT TYPE: 
  Simple Majority  
  Unanimity  
 
NUMBER OF JURORS ATTENDED (spare jurors included) 
 
 
 
 
DELIBERATION DETAILS 
 
NUMBER OF JURORS THAT DELIBERATED (excluding spare jurors) 
 
 
 
 
 
DELIB START TIME  DELIB END TIME   TOTAL DELIB TIME (MINUTES) 
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FOR UNANIMITY CONDITIONS: 
DID YOU PLAY THE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS? 
  No  
  Yes  At what time?  
 
 
FOREPERSON 
 
JUROR NUMBER: 
 
 
GENDER:    APPROX AGE: 
  Male  
  Female 
  
 
VERDICT RETURNED BY THE JURY: 
 
  Guilty    Not Proven 
  Not Guilty    Hung (no verdict returned) 
 
If qualified majority in an Unanimity condition, what was the stated balance of the 
verdicts? (write in numbers given by foreperson) 
 
  Guilty    Not Proven 
      
  Not Guilty     
 
 
PRE-DELIBERATION INDIVIDUAL VERDICTS, EXCLUDING SPARE JURORS (from the pre-
deliberation questionnaires) – write in number giving each verdict (Q1) 
 
  Guilty    Not Proven 
      
  Not Guilty     
 
 
POST-DELIBERATION INDIVIDUAL VERDICTS, EXCLUDING SPARE JURORS (from the post-
deliberation questionnaires) – write in number giving each verdict (Q1) 
 
  Guilty    Not Proven 
      
  Not Guilty     
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NOTES: 
(e.g. if the jurors asked questions or tried to return an inadmissible verdict) 
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Annex G – Video observation record sheet 
 
JURIES MAINSTAGE VIDEO OBSERVATION RECORD – PRIMARY 
CODER VERSION - CONFIDENTIAL WHEN COMPLETE  
 
General  
• These observation sheets will form a key part of the data for the study, 
so please ensure you complete fully, and discuss any issues you are 
not sure about with a colleague. 
• Completed sheets should be saved to: O:\CES\17-016941-01 
Juries\Mainstage\Analysis\Completed observation sheets\Observation 
sheets - primary coders. They should be clearly labelled with the Jury 
date, location and reference letter, your initials, and marked 
‘CONFIDENTIAL’. 
• Notes on the content (section 3) – should be completed with reference 
to output from NVivo coding of the transcript (e.g. data coded under 
relevant nodes).  
• Notes on the dynamics (section 4) will usually draw more on viewing the 
video of the deliberations. 
Process for adding new codes: 
• The codes below have been developed following viewing of the pilot 
deliberation films and the first 8 mainstage films, as well as extensive 
discussion within the team and with the Scottish Government. 
• If you feel that there are additional themes that are not fully captured by 
the codes listed here, please raise this with the rest of the research 
team in the first instance. If we agree a new code is needed: 
o This will be added to the node list in NVivo 
o An updated version of this observation sheet (and the secondary 
coder sheet) will be issued 
o We will then to check the relevant sections of transcripts for juries 
that have already been coded to see whether additional coding is 
required. We expect that most new codes will be additional sub-
themes under – so it should usually simply be a case of 
inspecting what was coded under the top-level node, and adding 
further sub-coding where appropriate.  
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1. BASIC DETAILS (See Jury record sheet/Excel outcome log – PLEASE 
TAKE FROM THIS RATHER THAN ESTIMATING) 
Jury date and location  
Jury ID letter  
Rape trial or assault trial?  
Number of verdicts  
Number of jurors deliberating  
Number of spare jurors  
Trial video ID  
Session researcher (who 
supervised the jury?) 
 
Deliberation observation sheet 
completed by 
 
Length of deliberations in 
minutes 
 
UNANIMOUS CONDITION: Was 
the additional direction read out? 
At what time? 
 
Verdict returned (Guilty/Not 
Guilty/Not Proven/Hung) 
 
Individual juror verdicts at start 
(from questionnaires) 
 
Individual juror verdicts at end 
(from questionnaires) 
 
Roughly how long did this 
observation sheet take to 
complete? (NOTE IF POSSIBLE 
HOW LONG EACH SECTION 
TOOK) 
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2. OVERVIEW OF DELIBERATIONS 
Please make brief notes here (no longer than half a side or so) 
summarising what you view as the key points – key issues focused on, 
general impressions of quality of discussion, overall jury dynamics, 
extent/nature of discussion of NP verdict. Also include brief notes on 
whether jurors appear to be engaging seriously with their task and 
treating it (as far as possible) as ‘real’. 
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3. THE CONTENT 
This section focuses on the CONTENT of the deliberations – WHAT was 
said. The dynamics of HOW things were said and the interactions 
between jurors should be logged in section 4. 
a) DISCUSSION OF THE EVIDENCE  
Purpose is to map the range of issues of evidence discussed in each 
jury – less concerned with content/what they thought of each. 
Discussion of the law/specific legal tests and of the Not Proven verdict 
are covered in sections b) and c).  
Issue Was it 
discussed? 
(Y/N – with 
reference 
to the 
coded 
NVivo data) 
BRIEF notes on any 
particularly salient points 
re. quality / extent of 
discussion. Focus on 
quality/extent rather than 
precise CONTENT.  
CREDIBILITY CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
3.1.1 - Demeanour of the accused 
on the stand (inc. comments that 
seemed honest) 
  
3.1.2 - Demeanour of the 
complainer on the stand (inc. 
comments that seemed honest) 
  
3.1.3 - Demeanour of the witness 
on the stand (inc. comments that 
seemed honest) 
  
3.1.4 - Believability / wider 
credibility of the accused (e.g. 
whether found story plausible or 
thought motivated to lie) 
  
3.1.5 - Believability / wider 
credibility of the complainer (e.g. 
whether found story plausible or 
thought motivated to lie) 
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3.1.6 - Believability / wider 
credibility of the witness (e.g. 
whether found story plausible or 
thought motivated to lie) 
  
3.1.7 - Difficulties of choosing 
between conflicting accounts in 
general (he said/she said etc.) 
  
3.2 - LEVEL OF CONSUMPTION 
OF ALCOHOL BY PARTIES 
INVOLVED 
  
3.3 - INJURIES  CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
3.3.1 - Complainer’s injuries – 
discussion of their nature/likely 
cause 
  
3.3.2 - Accused’s injuries – 
discussion of whether/why not 
injured 
  
3.4 - POSITION OF PARTIES 
during incident 
CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
3.4.1 - Fact intercourse took place 
on floor (RAPE TRIAL) 
  
3.4.2 - Position during intercourse 
(e.g. account of arm across chest, 
her underneath etc.) (RAPE TRIAL)  
  
3.4.3 - Position of parties during 
fight (ASSAULT TRIAL) 
  
3.4.4 - Position of witness during 
incident/likelihood of seeing incident 
(ASSAULT) 
  
3.5 - POSSESSION/OWNERSHIP 
OF KNIFE (ASSAULT) 
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3.6 - BEHAVIOUR OF ACCUSED 
BEFORE/DURING/AFTER THE 
INCIDENT 
CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
3.6.1 - Accepting wine (RAPE 
TRIAL) 
  
3.6.2 - Nature of conversation 
before incident (RAPE TRIAL) 
  
3.6.3 - Coming up again after 
dropping TV in car (RAPE) 
  
3.6.4 - Leaving scene after the 
incident (BOTH) 
  
3.6.5 - Why didn’t phone ambulance 
(ASSAULT) 
  
3.6.6 - Other aspect of behaviour of 
accused 
  
3.7 - BEHAVIOUR OF THE 
COMPLAINER 
BEFORE/DURING/AFTER THE 
INCIDENT 
CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
3.7.1 - Two previous phone calls 
(RAPE TRIAL) 
  
3.7.2 - Offering wine/inviting him 
over (RAPE TRIAL)  
  
3.7.3 - Reaction during incident 
(RAPE TRIAL) – e.g. level of 
resistance/whether shouted for help 
  
3.7.4 - Phonecall to sister (RAPE 
TRIAL) 
  
3.7.5 - (Timing of) phonecall to 
police (RAPE TRIAL) 
  
3.7.6 - Showering (RAPE TRIAL)   
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3.7.7 - Arguing with partner 
(ASSAULT) 
  
3.7.8 - Picking up the knife after 
being stabbed (ASSAULT) 
  
3.7.9 - Other aspect of behaviour of 
complainer 
  
3.8 - BEHAVIOUR of witness 
before/during/after incident 
(ASSAULT) 
  
3.9 - Other elements of evidence – 
SEE ABOVE ON ADDING NEW 
CODES 
  
3.10 – Missing evidence (any 
discussion around things that 
weren’t part of the evidence – e.g. 
previous sexual relationship) 
 
  
 
b) DISCUSSION OF THE LAW/ LEGAL TESTS  
Purpose is to map the range of LEGAL ISSUES raised in each jury. 
Discussion of the evidence and of the Not Proven verdict are covered in 
sections a) and c) 
Issue Was it 
discussed? 
(Yes/No – 
with 
reference 
to the 
coded 
data) 
BRIEF notes on any 
particularly salient points 
re. quality / extent of 
discussion. Focus on 
quality/extent rather than 
precise CONTENT.  
4.1 - SELF-DEFENCE 
(ASSAULT) 
CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
4.1.1 - General discussion of 
plausibility of the self-defence 
argument  
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4.1.2 - Specific references to 
reasonable belief in imminent 
danger of attack 
  
4.1.3 - Specific reference to 
violence as last resort 
  
4.1.4 - Specific reference to 
reasonable amount of force to 
stop an attack  
  
4.2 - LEGAL TESTS FOR RAPE  CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
4.2.1 - Whether evidence 
suggests complainer consented 
or not 
  
4.2.2 - Whether accused had 
reasonable belief in consent 
  
4.3 - CORROBORATION CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
4.3.1 - Discussion of meaning of 
corroboration 
  
4.3.2 - Discussion of whether 
witness’ account corroborates 
complainer or not  
  
4.4 - REASONABLE DOUBT/ 
STANDARD OF PROOF 
CODE 
ROWS 
BELOW 
 
4.4.1 - Discussion of meaning of 
reasonable doubt / standard of 
proof 
  
4.4.2 - Discussion of whether 
evidence leaves reasonable 
doubt /reaches standard of proof 
or not 
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4.5 - 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
OF LEGAL ISSUES 
On how many 
separate occasions 
was this 
misunderstanding 
expressed? 
(Discussion in one 
section of the 
deliberations counts 
as one occasion, 
even if statement is 
repeated during this 
section. If a statement 
is made, then re-
introduced after a 
change of topic, this 
counts as 2 separate 
occasions). 
On how many of the 
occasions it was 
raised was this 
misunderstanding 
challenged? (See left 
for definition of how to 
count separate 
occasions) 
Summary notes on what was 
discussed and what happened as 
result of any challenge to 
misunderstandings. Does challenge 
result in corrected understanding among 
jury (as far as you can tell), or do 
misunderstandings persist? 
 
4.5.1 - Belief that need to 
prove innocence in order to 
be found Not Guilty  
   
4.5.2 - ASSAULT – 
misunderstanding of fact 
‘self-defence’ is a legitimate 
defence for assault (i.e. 
think guilty because stabbed 
him, regardless of whether it 
was self-defence) 
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4.5.3 - Other probable 
misunderstanding 
(DESCRIBE ON RIGHT) – 
additional codes to be 
created if necessary, using 
process above. 
   
4.5.4 - OTHER LEGAL 
ISSUES/ASPECTS – see 
above on adding new 
codes 
 
   
 103 
c) DISCUSSION OF THE NOT PROVEN VERDICT  
For this section, in contrast with b) and c), we are also more interested in the detailed CONTENT of discussion of 
Not Proven, not just the range of points made. 
i. How much substantive discussion of the Not Proven verdict was there? I.e. discussion of its 
meaning/how it compares with NG. If reasons for choosing NP were given – e.g. as part of the round table - 
but without any elaboration on why it was chosen over NG or what people think NP means, then note this 
separately below. (delete as appropriate and add brief notes, including noting number of words coded 
under ‘Not Proven’ theme in NVivo, so we can check consistency of interpretation) 
• None at all 
• Only minimal/brief references 
• In some detail  
 
ii. What correct, incorrect, and other statements were made about the NP verdict? COMPLETE TABLE 
WITH REFERENCE TO NVIVO CODED DATA  
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STATEMENT On how many separate 
occasions was this 
statement expressed? 
(Discussion in one section 
of the deliberations counts 
as one occasion, even if 
statement is repeated 
during this section. If a 
statement is made, then 
re-introduced after a 
change of topic, this 
counts as 2 separate 
occasions). 
On how many of the 
occasions it was raised 
was this statement 
challenged? (See left for 
definition of how to count 
separate occasions) 
Summary notes on what was discussed 
and what happened as result of any 
challenge to statements about NP. Does 
challenge result in corrected understanding 
among jury (as far as you can tell), or do 
misunderstandings persist? 
 
5.1.1 - Can be 
retried if NP (F) 
   
5.1.2 - NP 
verdict goes on 
accused’s 
criminal record 
(F)  
   
5.1.3 - You 
should use NP 
if have not 
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proven 
innocence (F) 
5.1.4 - Legal 
consequences 
of NP are same 
as NG (T) 
   
5.1.5 - Cannot 
be retried if NP 
(T) 
   
5.1.6 - Do not 
get any kind of 
record if NP (T) 
   
5.1.7 - ‘Stigma’ 
attached to NP 
verdict  
   
5.1.8 - ‘NP 
means Guilty 
but can’t prove 
it’ 
   
5.1.9 – Would 
normally have 
NP in Scotland 
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(2 verdict 
conditions) 
5.1.10 - Other 
statement 
about NP 
verdict – SEE 
ABOVE ON 
ADDING NEW 
CODES 
   
 
iii.  (How) is NP compared to Not Guilty? And to Guilty? (SUMMARISE WITH REFERENCE TO NVIVO CODED 
DATA) 
 
iv. Where Jurors are considering or go for a NP verdict, what, if any, reasons do they give for choosing it over 
Guilty or Not Guilty? (SUMMARISE WITH REFERENCE TO NVIVO CODED DATA) 
 
v. Anything else noteworthy about how NP is discussed? 
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4. OBSERVATIONS OF JUROR DYNAMICS/INTERACTIONS 
Include time stamps of specific examples of interactions that demonstrate 
observations where possible  
i. FOREPERSON:  
• Which juror was foreperson? (Record number, gender – will get age from 
SPSS) 
• How was this decided (e.g. vote/someone nominated self or what?)  
• At roughly what stages/times?   
• What were the numbers for each verdict at each vote?  
• Note whether jurors were asked to go round and explain their verdict at 
each stage (i.e. how many ‘round tables’ like this did they have after 
votes?)  
 
ii. DOMINANT JURORS:  
• Were there any dominant jurors, meaning in this case any jurors who 
contribute very obviously substantially more than most other jurors?  
o Note their juror number and genders (will get age from SPSS).  
• What, if any, impact did this dominance appear to have on other jurors 
(e.g. changing mind, not contributing, or challenging dominant jurors? 
Acknowledging that may be difficult to judge this) 
 
iii. CONTRIBUTIONS BY JURORS  
It is difficult to define what counts as ‘minimal contributions’ – 
sometimes people make few but lengthy contributions, for example. 
However, broadly speaking, someone would be classed as only having 
contributed minimally if they make fewer than 3 contributions, 
excluding: 
o non-verbal contributions (nodding)  
o simple agreement (e.g. ‘yes I agree’ with no expansion) 
o very short contributions that are only made directly in response 
as part of a ‘going round the table’ after a vote to explain their 
verdict. 
If someone makes fewer than 3 contributions, but one or more 
contribution is more extended, you may decide they have nonetheless 
contributed more than minimally (please note where this is the case). 
As you watch the video, tick off jurors when you feel confident that they 
have contributed more than minimally, based on the criteria above.  
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Juror 
number 
SPACE TO TICK 
OFF 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Juror 
number 
SPACE TO TICK 
OFF 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
1  9  
2  10  
3  11  
4  12  
5  13  
6  14  
7  15  
8    
 
• How many jurors contributed only minimally (i.e. did not meet descriptions 
above)? Note any you were not sure about (and x-check with the 
secondary coders’ rating).  
• Note their juror numbers, genders (will get age from SPSS)  
• Overall, how frequently did you observe jurors apparently wanting to 
contribute but being unable to do so (e.g. being cut 
off/interrupted/obviously wanting to interject but being unable to do so)?  
o Not at all in this jury 
o Only very occasionally  
o Only during specific sections of discussion (say which), or 
o Regularly throughout the jury? 
 
iv. ATTEMPTS TO PERSAUDE/INFLUENCE OTHER JURORS: 
• Did jurors try directly to persuade others in the jury to change their 
verdict?  
• In what direction? How did they try and persuade them?  
• How hard did they appear to try?  
• What was the outcome of these attempts?  
 
v. TONE OF DISCUSSION 
• Was the overall tone of discussion between jurors (delete/highlight as 
appropriate): 
o always/almost always completely calm (can use if very occasionally 
slightly heated – if more than that use another code) 
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o occasionally more heated/animated  
o frequently more heated/animated? 
• Please add notes on the focus/nature of any more heated/animated 
disagreements. Were these resolved or not?  
 
vi. Any other observations on juror interactions? 
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Annex H – Statistical tests 
The following kinds of statistical tests were used in analysis of the quantitative data 
included in this report: 
• Observed differences between jury-level outcomes, where these can be 
expressed as percentages (e.g. % giving different verdicts), were tested 
using CHI-Squared and/or Fisher’s exact. Fisher’s exact is a more precise 
test that is used when the analysis includes cell sizes under 5 cases (as they 
often were at jury level, given there were 64 juries). 
• Differences in means (e.g. mean scores on questions on a scale at juror 
level, or mean length of deliberations at jury level) were tested using 2 way 
ANOVAs. 
• Differences in juror-level responses to questions in the pre- and post-
deliberation questionnaires were tested using either a CHI-squared test or a 
2-way T-test. CHI-squared was used when testing in general whether there 
was any variation in response to, for example, a 5 point agree-disagree 
question by condition. T-tests were used to check whether there was a 
significant difference on a specific response category (e.g. % agreeing), or 
when the number of possible responses was very high (e.g. reasons for 
choosing a particular verdict) so it made sense only to test those that could 
be significantly different (rather than testing every single category).  
• Logistic regression analysis was used in a number of cases to control for 
interactions between variables and establish which factors were most 
significantly associated with any difference observed. For example, logistic 
regression was used to examine which factors were most strongly associated 
with individual jurors favouring a guilty verdict post-deliberation. 
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Annex J – Additional tables 
 
Table J.1 – Mean length of jury deliberations BY experiemental condition  
Condition Mean length of 
deliberations 
(mins) 
Min length Max length (90 
was max 
possible) 
Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 45 14 90 64 
Trial type     
Assault trial 37 14 82 32 
Rape trial 54 22 90 32 
Number of verdicts      
2-verdict conditions 46 14 90 32 
3-verdict conditions 45 18 90 32 
Number of jurors      
12-person juries 43 14 90 32 
15-person juries 48 20 90 32 
Majority type      
Simple majority 37 14 90 32 
Unanimous 54 20 90 32 
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Table J.2 – Frequency with which jurors observed wanting to contribute, but being 
unable to do so BY condition (number of juries) 
Condition Not at all / only 
occasionally / only 
in specific sections 
Regularly 
throughout the jury 
Number of juries 
ALL 64 juries 49 15 64 
Trial type (sig.)    
Assault trial 20 12 32 
Rape trial 29 3 32 
Number of verdicts (NOT 
sig.)  
   
2-verdict conditions 24 8 32 
3-verdict conditions 25 7 32 
Number of jurors (sig.)    
12-person juries 30 2 32 
15-person juries 19 13 32 
Majority type (NOT sig.)    
Simple majority 26 6 32 
Unanimous 23 9 32 
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Table J.3 – Mean number of jurors identified as dominant BY condition 
Condition Mean number of 
dominant jurors 
Min. Max. Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 1.4 0 5 64 
Trial type (sig.)     
Assault trial 1.9 0 4 32 
Rape trial 1.0 0 5 32 
Number of verdicts 
(NOT sig.)  
    
2-verdict conditions 1.6 0 5 32 
3-verdict conditions 1.3 0 3 32 
Number of jurors (sig.)     
12-person juries 1.0 0 5 32 
15-person juries 1.8 0 4 32 
Majority type (NOT 
sig.) 
    
Simple majority 1.3 0 4 32 
Unanimous 1.6 0 5 32 
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Table J.4 – Mean number of jurors identified as ‘minimally contributing’ BY 
condition 
Condition Mean number of 
minimally 
contributing 
jurors 
Min. Max. Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 2.0 0 7 64 
Trial type (sig.)     
Assault trial 2.6 0 7 32 
Rape trial 1.5 0 6 32 
Number of verdicts 
(NOT sig.)  
    
2-verdict conditions 2.1 0 6 32 
3-verdict conditions 2.0 0 7 32 
Number of jurors (sig.)     
12-person juries 1.6 0 5 32 
15-person juries 2.5 0 7 32 
Majority type (NOT 
sig.) 
    
Simple majority 2.0 0 7 32 
Unanimous 2.0 0 6 32 
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Table J.5 – Proportion of jurors who agreed/disagreed with ‘I felt that some 
members of the jury talked too much’ BY condition (row %) 
 
Condition Agree/ Strongly 
agree 
Neither Disagree/ 
Strongly 
disagree 
Base (number 
of jurors, 
excluding ‘Not 
sure’ or Not 
Answered) 
ALL 64 juries 35% 24% 41% 837 
Trial type (NOT sig.)     
Assault trial 35% 23% 42% 415 
Rape trial 36% 25% 39% 422 
Number of verdicts 
(sig.)  
    
2-verdict conditions 38% 25% 37% 420 
3-verdict conditions 33% 22% 45% 417 
Number of jurors (sig.)     
12-person juries 28% 24% 48% 373 
15-person juries 41% 24% 35% 464 
Majority type (NOT 
sig.) 
    
Simple majority 37% 23% 40% 418 
Unanimous 34% 25% 42% 419 
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Table J.6 – Mean influence score (1-7, where 1 = no influence and 7 = a great deal 
of influence) BY condition 
Condition Mean perceived influence 
score 
Base (all jurors who 
deliberated, excluding ‘don’t 
know’ / not answered) 
ALL 64 juries 4.3 827 
Trial type (NOT sig.)   
Assault trial 4.3 418 
Rape trial 4.3 409 
Number of verdicts (NOT 
sig.) 
  
2-verdict conditions 4.3 409 
3-verdict conditions 4.3 418 
Number of jurors (sig.)   
12-person juries 4.5 367 
15-person juries 4.1 460 
Majority type (sig.)   
Simple majority 4.1 421 
Unanimous 4.5 406 
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Table J.7 – Difference in observed tone of jury deliberations BY condition (number 
of juries) 
 
Condition Always / almost 
always 
completely 
calm 
Occasionally 
more heated / 
animated 
Frequently 
heated / 
animated 
Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 27 22 15 64 
Trial type     
Assault trial 16 6 10 32 
Rape trial 11 16 5 32 
Number of verdicts      
2-verdict conditions 10 12 10 32 
3-verdict conditions 17 12 5 32 
Number of jurors      
12-person juries 16 12 4 32 
15-person juries 11 10 11 32 
Majority type      
Simple majority 16 12 4 32 
Unanimous 11 10 11 32 
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Table J.8 – Juror confidence in the verdict returned BY condition (row %, all jurors 
except those in hung juries) 
Condition Very / fairly 
confident 
Not very / not at all 
confident 
Base (all jurors 
except hung juries 
and those ‘Not 
sure’ or Not 
Answered) 
ALL 64 juries 81% 19% 716 
Trial type (sig.)    
Assault trial 89% 11% 366 
Rape trial 73% 27% 350 
Number of verdicts (sig.)     
2-verdict conditions 78% 22% 330 
3-verdict conditions 83% 17% 386 
Number of jurors (NOT sig.)    
12-person juries 82% 18% 330 
15-person juries 80% 20% 386 
Majority type (sig.)    
Simple majority 76% 24% 408 
Unanimous 87% 13% 308 
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Table J.9 – Difference in observed level of substantive discussion of the not proven 
verdict BY condition (number of juries) 
 
Condition None at all Brief references In some detail Number of 
juries 
ALL 64 juries 21 28 15 64 
Trial type     
Assault trial 13 15 4 32 
Rape trial 8 13 11 32 
Number of verdicts      
2-verdict conditions 16 12 4 32 
3-verdict conditions 5 16 11 32 
Number of jurors      
12-person juries 8 17 7 32 
15-person juries 13 11 8 32 
Majority type      
Simple majority 12 13 7 32 
Unanimous 9 15 8 32 
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Table J.10 – Juror views on the appropriate verdict to return if they think the 
accused is guilty but the evidence does not prove it beyond reasonable doubt, BY 
experimental condition  
 
Condition Return 
guilty 
verdict 
Return 
not 
guilty 
verdict 
Return not 
proven 
verdict 
Return either 
not guilty or 
not proven 
Don’t 
know/ not 
answered 
Number of 
Jurors (all 
participants) 
ALL 64 juries 5% 12% 70% 7% 6% 969 
Trial type (sig.)       
Assault trial 8% 13% 64% 8% 7% 478 
Rape trial 3% 11% 75% 6% 4% 491 
Number of 
verdicts (sig.) 
            
2-verdict 
conditions 
4% 20% 63% 8% 5% 484 
3-verdict 
conditions 
7% 5% 77% 6% 6% 485 
Number of jurors 
(NOT sig.)  
            
12-person juries 4% 12% 71% 7% 5% 425 
15-person juries 6% 12% 69% 7% 6% 544 
Majority type 
(sig.)  
      
Simple majority 6% 11% 73% 6% 5% 488 
Unanimous 5% 14% 66% 9% 7% 481 
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Table J.11 – Rape trial jurors’ stated reasons for initial view on the verdict (three-
verdict condition only) 
 Guilty Not guilty Not 
proven 
General references to whether there is enough evidence to 
convict and/or references to missing evidence/additional 
evidence needed 
42% 58% 64% 
Reference to specific element(s) of the evidence presented 76% 65% 42% 
Specific references to corroboration or whether witness 
account is consistent/compelling 
24% 28% 37% 
Specific references to whether evidence proves 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' or meets standard of proof 
9% 19% 34% 
Difficulty choosing between accounts of complainer and 
accused 
2% 12% 28% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the witness 34% 19% 21% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the complainer 66% 33% 20% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the accused 41% 16% 12% 
References to whether specific legal arguments are plausible 
or tests met (i.e. whether evidence suggests consent, or 
reasonable belief in consent) 
35% 28% 12% 
Reason suggesting a legal misunderstanding (e.g. saying the 
accused has not proven innocence) 
2% 0% 0% 
Sample size 88 43 113 
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Table J.12 – Assault trial jurors’ stated reasons for initial view on the verdict (three-
verdict condition only) 
 Guilty Not guilty Not 
proven 
Reference to specific element(s) of the evidence presented 73% 59% 60% 
General references to whether there is enough evidence to 
convict and/or references to missing evidence/additional 
evidence needed 
41% 42% 60% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the witness 18% 53% 45% 
References to whether specific legal arguments are plausible 
or tests met (i.e. whether evidence suggests consent, or 
reasonable belief in consent) 
68% 41% 35% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the complainer 14% 37% 24% 
Specific references to corroboration or whether witness 
account is consistent/compelling 
5% 28% 24% 
Perceived credibility or reliability of the accused 9% 22% 22% 
Specific references to whether evidence proves 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' or meets standard of proof 
2% 13% 18% 
Difficulty choosing between accounts of complainer and 
accused 
2% 6% 17% 
Reason suggesting a legal misunderstanding (e.g. saying the 
accused has not proven innocence) 
27% 2% 1% 
Sample size 44 64 125 
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Table J.13: Rape trial jurors’ specific evidence cited in reasons for initial view on the 
verdict (three-verdict condition only) 
 Guilty Not guilty Not proven 
Nature, extent or likely cause of complainer’s injuries 58% 23% 32% 
Medical evidence enough, or not enough, or other reference 
to doctor’s evidence 
13% 14% 24% 
Lack of other evidence, missing evidence, photos, CCTV, 
other witnesses 
2% 9% 9% 
Complainer offering wine or inviting him over 0% 21% 7% 
They kissed, he kissed her, and/or she kissed him back 9% 19% 6% 
Complainer phoning accused previously 5% 16% 5% 
Nature, extent or likely cause of accused’s injuries or lack 
thereof 
0% 7% 4% 
Complainer’s reaction during incident 7% 2% 4% 
Still had feelings for each other 1% 7% 4% 
Accused coming up again after dropping TV 8% 7% 3% 
Timing of complainer’s phone call to police 11% 16% 3% 
Listened to discussion or convinced by what other jurors 
said 
2% 0% 2% 
Nature of conversation before alleged rape 2% 9% 2% 
Complainer’s phone call to sister 2% 9% 2% 
Level of alcohol consumed 0% 5% 1% 
Fact intercourse on the floor 1% 0% 1% 
Showering after incident 0% 2% 1% 
Accused leaving scene after incident 0% 2% 0% 
Position during intercourse 6% 9% 0% 
Accused accepting wine 2% 0% 0% 
Sample size 88 43 113 
  
 124 
Annex K – Remit and membership of the 
Research Advisory Group 
 
The remit of the Research Advisory Group was to: 
• Monitor general progress of the research; 
• Provide a forum for collaborative issues resolution; 
• Keep policy and key stakeholders informed and provide an opportunity for them 
to discuss the research directly with the researchers; 
• Provide a forum for researchers to explain the potential and the limits of the 
research; 
• Assist researchers by providing advice, contacts, introductions and access to 
data where relevant; 
• Advise, when appropriate, on technical (e.g. legal) aspects of the research; 
• Advise on the content and presentation of the research reports; 
• Provide feedback on interim and final reports (quality control); 
• Advise on an appropriate dissemination strategy. 
 
The membership of the Research Advisory Group was: 
• Willie Cowan, Deputy Director Criminal Justice (Chair)  
• Lesley Bagha, Head of Criminal Justice Reform & Licensing Unit (Deputy 
Chair)  
• Karen Auchincloss, Criminal Justice Reform Team Leader (Policy Lead) 
• Tamsyn Wilson, Senior Researcher, Justice Analytical Services (SG Contract 
Manager) / Catherine Bisset, Principal Researcher, Justice Analytical Services 
(SG Contract Manager) 
• Kay McCorquodale, Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service 
• Sheriff Duff, Judicial Institute 
• Lord Turnbull 
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